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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
The first chapter proposes three hypotheses about the effects of government stability and 
encompassing interest, which originated from Olson (1982) classic, The Rise and Decline 
of Nations, on cross-country economic growth. First, the government stability affects the 
average economic growth rate concavely. Second, encompassing interest has a convex 
effect on expected growth rate. Third, two nonlinear effects integrate into a polynomial 
W-shaped curve. The hypotheses are tested on two datasets: Cross National Time Series 
(1975) and World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III (1986). A wide variety 
of government stability and encompassing interest measures provide solid statistical 
evidence for the two nonlinear effects as well as the polynomial effect  
Developing countries in the past three decades embraced capital account 
liberalization as a way of attracting international capital flows in hope of boosting 
economic growth. But the outcomes of the policy across countries are contingent on the 
initial economic conditions, the pace of trade liberalization, and the features of other 
domestic structural reforms. The second chapter directly examines the rarely discussed 
optimal liberalization sequence among different capital account transactions and extends 
the literature on the subject along two dimensions. First, I create liberalization intensity 
indicators for three types of capital transactions: banking transactions, portfolio 
investment transactions, and direct investment transactions based on the IMF 
disaggregated restriction dummies for 12 subcategories of capital transactions in a sample 
of 33 countries, most of them OECD countries. Second, in a multiplicative interaction 
 vi 
model, I find the optimal sequence of liberalizing portfolio investment transactions 5 
years earlier and direct investment transactions 1 year earlier than banking transactions is 
correlated with 0.6 percent higher annual economic growth rate in the 1990s.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Classification: O1, O11, F33 
Keywords: Government Stability; Encompassing Interest; Economic Growth; Capital 
Account Liberalization; Sequencing Reform.  
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Chapter 1 
 
A Tale of Two Olsons 
I. Introduction 
 
Over a span of nearly two decades, Mancur Olson’s provocative research 
extensively explores the interaction between economic performance and governance 
structure. In his 1982 classic book, The Rise and Decline of Nations, Olson argues that 
entrenched interest groups in long lasting regimes engage in rent seeking activity at the 
cost of unorganized interests in society. Overall, the net negative effect imposed on 
society by special interests leads to slow economic growth in a stable polity. Olson 
suggests that periodic upheaval within political institutions can counteract the harmful 
influence of entrenched interest coalitions and keep the state governance efficient. Thus, 
a stable political institution cannot persistently promote economic growth.  
Olson suggests that an ‘encompassing interest’ group that represents the interest 
of the majority of the public would solve problems in a rent seeking society. The group 
with ‘an encompassing interest’ once in power can be led by its own self-interest to 
improve overall social welfare, in terms of supplying public goods including both 
infrastructures and sound economic policies, to maximize their own economic interest in 
society. McGuire and Olson (1996) again promote the concept of “encompassing 
interest” in their analysis of autocracy and majority rule of democracy.  
In this paper, I develop and test three refutable hypotheses from Olson’s work. 
Eventually, I find two nonlinear effects and one polynomial effect, consistent with the 
predictions of three hypotheses, in cross-country economic growth data. First, 
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government stability has a concave effect. Second, encompassing interest has a convex 
effect on economic growth. Moreover, the evidence confirms that two entities could have 
polynomial effects, and together generate a polynomial W-shaped relationship with 
economic growth. Unlike previous empirical work, which tests Olson’s theory mostly on 
the OECD countries, the statistical analysis here is conducted on a large number of 
countries over the period from 1960 to 1982 in two datasets made available by Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR): (1) Cross National 
Time Series (1976) has as many as 72 countries over the period of 1960 – 1973 upon the 
availability of data, (2) The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III (1986) 
covers up to 92 countries for 1960 – 1982. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II outlines the hypotheses of the nonlinear 
effects as well as the polynomial effect by government stability and encompassing 
interests. Section III reviews previous empirical work on Olson’s theory. Section IV and 
V present evidence for concave and convex effects. Section VI presents the polynomial 
effects of stability and encompassing interests, as well as the evidence for the W-curve. 
Section VII gives the conclusion.  
II. Nonlinear Effects in Cross-Country Economic Growth 
A. Concave Effects of Government Stability  
To curb the net negative effects imposed on society by entrenched special interest 
coalitions, Olson argues that periodic upheaval within the political institution would 
counteract this harmful influence. Olson (1982) claims that the rapid economic recovery 
of Germany and Japan after World War II was mainly due to the comprehensive 
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bureaucratic meltdown during the war. In both cases, the economic growth patterns 
match the trend implied by Olson’s theory.  
In his later work, Olson balances the extreme view against special interest groups 
with a relatively realistic argument that the existence of incumbent coalitions within a 
society are necessary for achieving persistent economic growth, particularly for those 
eastern European countries trying to move from centrally planned economies to free 
market economies. Olson (1993) more explicitly and formally argues that the stability of 
a single autocrat or “stationary bandit” is superior to the competitive rent seeking of a 
large number of autocrats acting as “roving bandits.”  
Rose-Ackerman (2003) argues that Olson implied two types of stability in his 
work: the stability of fixed laws and practices (which she calls “framework stability”), 
and the stability of rigid power relationships between economic and political agents in 
society (which she calls “coalitional stability”). To facilitate voluntary economic 
transactions, individuals first need to agree upon at least a couple of fundamental rules, 
tacitly, to clarify the property rights. The framework stability ultimately comes from the 
consent among individuals on the delimitation of political, economic, and social rights 
through either peaceful negotiation or violent confrontation. As social conflicts get 
resolved smoothly, individuals will concentrate more on conducting long-term and 
sophisticated voluntary exchanges, and eventually the economy will grow accordingly.  
Framework stability can promote economic growth but not indefinitely. Quite the 
contrary, the society, which is too “stable”, will not experience persistent economic 
growth. The stagnancy of the economy comes from the entrenched interests or coalitional 
stability. The powerful narrow interest groups, such as insiders in government or rich 
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private business people, will constantly seek governmental discretion to strengthen their 
privileged position in society and enhance their advantage in rent seeking activities. 
Consequently, the more coalitional stability a society has, the more stable is the society 
and the slower economic growth it would expect.  
I integrate two types of stability, framework and coalition stability, into one index 
of stability. Framework stability is the initial stage of stability that each government, 
regardless of the type of polity, seeks to achieve and maintain at certain established 
levels. Coalition stability is the secondary stage of stability closely embedded into the 
framework stability. Lacking framework stability, it is impossible for organized interest 
groups to entrench themselves into the governance institutions. Thus, the framework 
stability represents a low level of government stability, whereas the coalition stability 
reveals a high level of government stability.  
A country usually has an accelerating economic growth if a new ruling group 
successfully consolidates its power quickly enough after coming into power. As the 
regime becomes more stable, the growth rate will stop climbing up and become stagnant 
thought at a relatively high level. Unfortunately, the growth momentum could reverse 
when entrenched interest groups growing out of the stable regime become active in rent 
seeking activities. Narrow interest groups favoring a small clique at the cost of general 
society will manipulate the public policy. If the stability level in the country continues to 
increase, the economic growth rate will fall. Thus, the relationship between growth and 
the degree of social stability can best be illustrated by a concave curve with the degree of 
stability on the horizontal axis and economic growth on the vertical axis. As Figure 1 
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shows, a country would have the most satisfactory economic performance after achieving 
the “optimal” degree of stability at point S, ceteris paribus.  
 
B. Convex Effect of Encompassing Interests 
The “encompassing interest” issue is first raised in Olson (1982) and then 
developed into “super encompassing interests” in McGuire and Olson (1996). In 
autocracy, the super- encompassing interest of a secure autocrat gives him incentives to 
take into account the interest of people living in his territory. The secure autocrat does not 
prefer confiscation of private assets through state power. To the contrary, the autocrat 
provides public goods that benefit the whole society from resources under his control in 
order to increase his share of national wealth in the form of taxes imposed on the private 
sector. In democracy, a society with super-encompassing interest is a “consensus 
democracy” having a distribution of endowments that enjoys unanimous support from the 
public, according to Olson and McGuire (1996). Extending the concept of super-
encompassing interest to the extreme scenario, we would come to a society with one 
single interest group including all people that perfectly tallies gains and losses for 
efficient policy making. The idealized society with perfect social cooperation, as 
McGuire and Olson (1996) posits, is as follows: “[T] he consensus democracy can also 
be thought of as a perfectly benevolent and fair dictator.” The opposite idealized society 
is the one having no encompassing interest at all. In this scenario, individuals voluntarily 
interact in a perfectly competitive free market. The consensus has been that the more 
competitive a country’s economy is, the higher is the overall growth rate of the economy.  
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In the real world, however, encompassing interests’ level is always between the 
two extremes. Hypothetically, all levels of encompassing interests can be arranged as an 
“Encompassing Interests” (“EI”, hereafter) index in the Herfindahl form, the sum of 
squared population shares represented by all special interests groups in the society. On 
the one hand, the perfectly competitive society has an index close to 0. On the other hand, 
the super encompassing interest has an index of 10000. All other cases should have an 
“EI” index between 0 and 10000. The economic growth rates of those countries departing 
from the idealized societies are relatively lower, due to the rent seeking activities done by 
special interests, than the growth rates of the previously stated two polar cases. In this 
way, I propose that the overall pattern of relationship between economic growth rate and 
the level of encompassing interests is convex. As Figure 2 shows, encompassing interests 
first correlates with economic growth rate in a negative way, but the trend reverses after 
the index of encompassing interest passes a turning point, ceteris paribus.  
C. Is There a W-shape Curve? 
 The idealized society in Olson’s work is a society having a super encompassing 
interest, under which there never will be rent seeking activities. As Olson insightfully 
points out, common interest groups form slowly, large and scattered interests may never 
organize, and the encompassing interests in the real world usually take the form of 
entrenched interests, attempting to manipulate public policy in their own favor at the cost 
of unorganized interests in society. Coalitional interest groups accumulate over time but 
hardly ever become close to encompassing interest groups, and hence the country is 
trapped in special interest pitfalls.  
 7 
Olson does not merely diagnose the problems behind slow growth but also 
provides ways in which countries can escape. Olson’s suggestion is that periodic 
upheaval of special interest groups could increase economic growth rates. Geometrically, 
periodic upheaval among society’s encompassing interests to sustain economic growth 
above a threshold rate can be described by a W-shaped curve as in Figure 3, where the 
bottom part of the convex curve is replaced by a concave curve as if it is being flipped 
over.  
The far left downward slope of the W-shaped curve represents the situation of a 
declining growth rate as encompassing interests start to exist in a society. The middle 
concave part of the curve corresponds to the situation where encompassing interests take 
the form of special interests during its slow evolution. Since special interests choke off 
economic growth, periodic upheavals start to take place to counteract their influence. The 
shakeup of special interests, however, needs to be constrained by a certain degree of 
stability. As argued before, the degree of governmental stability has a concave effect on 
economic growth during the time when encompassing interests keep growing but still 
can’t represent the majority of the public. The far right upward slope of the W-shaped 
curve represents an ever-increasing growth trend, as encompassing interests become a 
dominant force in shaping public policies. Basically, the W-shaped curve may portray the 
aggregate effects of government stability and encompassing interests on economic 
growth across countries.  
III. Previous Work on Encompassing Interest, Stability and Economic 
Performance 
Calmfors and Driffill (1988), Heitager (1987), and Summers, Gruber, and Vergara 
(1993) are cross-sectional studies of encompassing interest and economic performance. 
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They have all mainly used indices of corporatism as a measure of encompassing interest 
and relate it to macroeconomic performance. In addition, Grier and Grier (2000) have 
undertaken an important time series study on encompassing interest. They show in the 
case of Mexico that there is a significant 6-year presidential election cycle over the period 
1970-96. Moreover, they find that growth slowdown and inflation uncertainty augment in 
the year after presidential elections, which are consistent with the prediction of their 
adapted McGuire and Olson 1996 model.   
 Murrell adds to the literature a series of papers on the formation and influence of 
interest groups in OECD countries. In Murrell (1982), the main measure of interest 
groups is the number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The number of NGOs 
is basically correlated to the number of industries, the number of political parties, and the 
size of populations in OECD countries. Murrell (1984) shows a very preliminary pattern 
of industrial growth in six industrialized countries – US, UK, Canada, Japan, Germany 
and Italy – to provide general support of Olson’s theory. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1991) argues that countries in which rent seeking benefits the ablest people more than 
organizing production would expect economic stagnation since the allocation of talent is 
distorted. Murphy et al. also present supporting empirical evidence that countries with a 
higher proportion of engineering majors grow faster than countries with a higher 
proportion of law majors.  
The existing quantitative studies of political stability and economic growth have 
yielded contradictory findings. Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, and Swagel (1996) find that 
countries with a high propensity of government collapse have low economic growth, 
though they also find that low economic growth does not affect political instability. 
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Londregan and Poole (1990) do not find evidence of slow economic growth as a 
consequence of increased political instability; instead, they infer from their analysis that 
slow economic growth increases the probability of political instability. Specifically, they 
indicate that the probability that a government is overthrown by a coup d’état is 
substantially influenced by the rate of economic growth. From a different perspective, 
Posner (1997) presents empirical evidence derived from a large sample of the economic 
and political data of 89 countries in support of the claim that average incomes in a 
society, rather than the equality of income, increases political stability. Feng (1997) 
illustrates in a three-stage least square system that stability has a positive effect on 
economic growth but only when the country is democratic.   
All previous works focus on the linear effect of encompassing interest or 
government stability on economic growth. In the next section, I present evidence of 
nonlinear effects on economic performance, as discussed above.  
 
IV.  Concave Effects of Stability on Economic Performance 
A.   Data and Empirical Model 
The evidence of concave effects from stability is presented in this section, and the 
results of encompassing interests’ convex effects in the following section. The baseline 
model is OLS cross-country growth regression model as follows:  
Yi = β0 + β1 (Stabilityi) + β2 (Stabilityi) 
2 + Xi’ γ + εi    (1) 
stability measures are uncovered independently from Cross-National Time Series 
Dataset, CNTS hereafter [e.g. Banks(1976)]. As the version of CNTS utilized has 
coverage up to 1973, the analysis is first focused on the period of 1960-1973.  
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The dependent variable in the baseline model is the average growth rate of real 
output per worker over the period 1960-73 obtained from Penn World Table 6.1, PWT6.1 
hereafter [e.g. Heston, Summers, & Aten (2002)]. The control variables (Xi) include: real 
GDP per capita of 1960, investment as share of GDP of 1960 as a proxy of physical 
capital, and secondary school attainment level in the population above age 25 in 1960 as 
a measure of human capital. The first two control variables are also obtained from PWT 
6.1. The education attainment data are from Barro and Lee’s Cross-Country Education 
Attainment Database 2000 [e.g. Barro and Lee (2000)].  
B.  Statistical Evidence 
The first measure of stability is the age of currency. In CNTS, the age of a 
nation's currency is the number of months that have elapsed in each year since the 
introduction of a new monetary system or since an upward or downward revaluation of 
5% or more1. I take the average of the number of months for each country over the 14-
year sample period and name it “Currency” as stability measure in Equation 1.  
Governments that are relatively unstable would behave as “roving bandits” and be 
likely to manipulate currency valuation frequently to collect enormous seigniorage tax. 
As a government becomes more stable, it will have more incentives to provide public 
goods. As a result, the government would want to establish a stable currency over a long 
horizon, which means less frequent revaluation, to facilitate economic growth. Thus, the 
longer the age of currency, the more stable will be the government.  
Before jumping into the statistical evidence, a visual inspection of the raw data 
seems appropriate. Figure 4 shows the scattered chart between the age of currency and 
                                                 
1 In cases of multiple revaluations totaling 5% or more during a given year, the count of months is from the 
last of such revaluation. 
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real output per worker growth rate with a fitted concave trend line that is generated by 
Microsoft Excel. A large group of countries with a currency age that is less than 80 
months has an average growth rate below 2%: Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Bangladesh, 
Cameroon, Rwanda, Central Africa Republic, Uruguay, Benin, Zaire, Uganda, Nepal, 
Zambia, Guyana, Bolivia and Chile. Half of the 14 countries that have an above 5% 
average growth rate fall into the range between 90 and 235: Spain (95), Cyprus (100), 
Iran (121), Austria (152), Greece (157), Japan (218) and Italy (235). The other half of the 
group includes Ghana (30), Congo (30), Israel (43), Korea (46), Singapore (58), Taiwan 
(74) and Portugal (324). Along the downward slope of the concave curve are countries 
whose currency age is between 250 and 400 months and growth rate is between 2% and 
4%:  Switzerland, US, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Panama. Haiti has the most stable 
currency – 512 months – and its economy grew only at 0.2% during the period of 1960-
73.   
The statistical results also support a concave relation between the age of currency 
and economic growth rates. In the first column of both Panel A and B of Table 1, the 
coefficient of the linear term of Currency is positive and significant at the 0.05 level, 
while that of the quadratic term in the Panel B is negative and also significant at the 0.05 
level. The implied growth maximization currency age is 283 months. Almost all observed 
values, 80 out of 86, are smaller, suggesting that most countries in the sample are 
relatively instable in terms of the currency stability. The initial real output per work and 
investment share as real GDP in 1960 have the expected coefficient sign and are 
significant the 0.01 level.  
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 CNTS reports the frequency of domestic conflicts: assassinations, general strikes, 
guerilla warfare, government crisis, purges, riots, revolutions, anti-government 
demonstration, coups d`etat, and constitutional changes. For each country, I sum up the 
number of each domestic conflict over the 14-year period. None but riots generate 
statistically significant concave results if serving as a unique stability measure. Next, I 
cluster the ten domestic conflicts into two groups as a dyad of stability measures: (a) 
violent conflicts including assassination, guerilla warfare, riots, revolutions, and coups 
d`etat; and (b) non-violent conflicts including general strikes, government crisis, purges, 
anti-government demonstration, and constitutional changes. I name two measures 
“Violence” and “Nonvio.” The fewer occurrences of domestic conflicts, the more stable 
is that incumbent government.   
In the top panel of Table 1, “Nonviolence” has a linear term only significant at the 
0.1 level, while “Violence” has an insignificant coefficient for its linear term.  The 
bottom panel presents the nonlinear results for the two measures. The US is an outlier in 
the sample having 252 nonviolent conflicts that are three times the second highest of 84 
in Argentina, and 209 violent conflicts that are 50% more than the second highest of 140 
in India. So the results are sensitive to the inclusion of US in the sample. However, 
adding the quadratic term into the equation allows the linear terms to become robustly 
statistically significant regardless of the influence of the outlier. “Nonviolence” has a 
quadratic term statistically significant at the 0.05 level with US in the sample. On the 
contrary, “Violence” can have the quadratic term of the same significance as “Nonvio” 
only after US is excluded from the sample. Thus, the column of “Nonviolence” has a 
sample of 75 and the column of “Violence” has 74. Given the coefficients of their 
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quadratic terms in the Panel B, “Nonviolence” has a maximal level of 140 and 
“Violence” has 64. If the US is excluded, the maximal level of “Nonviolence” for growth 
is 54. As two thirds of the sample have less conflicts of either type than the implied 
optimal level, it suggests that most countries can be thought as relatively stable in terms 
of the frequency of domestic conflicts.  
 Several empirical studies have looked at some aspects of the defense spending 
and economic development relationship, especially in less-developed countries. Benoit 
(1978), employing a single equation model, concludes that there is a positive and 
significant correlation between the amount of defense expenditure and economic growth 
in a sample of 44 less developed countries, LDCs hereafter, between 1950 and 1965. 
However, Lim (1983) claims that increased defense spending is associated with 
decreased economic growth in a bigger sample of 54 LDCs during the period of 1965-73 
within the framework of the Harrod-Domar capital-driven growth model. Biswas and 
Ram (1985), with an augmented neoclassical growth model, finds that defense spending 
has no consistent, statistically significant impact on economic growth for the sample of 
74 LDCs between 1960 and 1977. Neither the military sector generates any externality 
effects on the civilian sector, nor is the factor productivity differential between two 
sectors significant. They further conclude that whether one finds a positive or a negative 
correlation between defense spending and economic growth depends on the geographical 
coverage of the sample, the sample period, and model specification.  
In this paper, I test the effect of defense burden on economic growth from the 
perspective of the relation between national defense expenditure and stability. According 
to Acemoglu (2005), “weak states” lack the power to tax and regulate the economy and to 
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withstand the political and social challenges from private sectors. Military power of 
central governments can represent the degree of their coercive power to regulate 
economy as well as society. In countries with a small size of military corps, incumbent 
governments are expected to be easily challenged by domestic political groups and then 
can be unstable. When a state is strong in military power, the ruler could take advantage 
of the stability built on the coercive power by interfering with the economy to benefit his 
own economic interests with no fear of significant oppositions.  
I use variables in CNTS on national defense aspects as the third type of stability 
measures: per capita national defense expenditure, military size including only active-
duty members of a nation's armed forces (army, navy, and air corps), and military size as 
a proportion of population, which are named as “DefCap”, “Milisize” and “Milipop" 
respectively. In columns 3, 4 and 5 of table 1, the linear coefficients of the measures in 
the 14-year average (1960-73) are positive and significant at the 0.05 level and the 
quadratic terms become negative and significant at the same level. Similarly, the control 
variables all have the expected sign and are significant at 0.05 levels.  
The results for “DefCap” become significant only after taking out from the 
regression the outlier US, whose per capita defense expenditure is $284. The “DefCap” 
value for the maximal growth given the coefficients is $87, which is three times larger 
than the sample average $24. Among 57 countries in the sample, UK, Sweden and Israel 
have an average “DefCap” of more than $87.  The implied optimal value of “Milipop” is 
0.051 or 5.1%, far greater than most observed values, which are below 2%. Only 
Switzerland and Israel have a ratio above 5%, which are 6.4% and 10.3%. Regarding 
military size, US is again an outlier in the sample with approximately 2.8 million military 
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personnel, three times more than the size of India, the second largest military in the 
sample. The nonlinear effect of “Milisize” is robust to the outlier. But the implied optimal 
military size for growth changes substantially if the outlier is included: 1.5 million if US 
is counted and 414,000 otherwise. There are only seven countries besides US in the 
sample having a military size over 400,000: Switzerland (411,000), UK (428,000), 
Turkey (452,000), Taiwan (537,000), Korea (602,000), France (650,000) and India 
(876,000). Thus, the empirical results suggest that most countries of the sample in the 
1960s until early 1970s were relatively unstable in terms of the size of military power 
possessed by governments.  
 Press freedom also can reveal government stability level. If an incumbent 
government is confident about its control over the economic and political system, it 
should be able to tolerate more freedom in mass media because debates and criticisms 
upon any economic and political issues will not significantly change property rights 
delineation within the territory. Thus, the outcome of the eventual economic policies will 
be predictable for the government. Thus it is reasonable to suggest that the level of press 
freedom is positively correlated with government stability. Besly and Case (2002) 
presents the results that state governments in India during the period of 1958-1992 are 
more alert to food shortage and crop flood damage by means of public food distribution 
and calamity relief programs where newspaper circulations are higher, since a more 
informed electorate strengthens incentives for politicians to be responsive to the public 
preference. Moreover, Besly and Prat (2004) develop a model of democratic politics in 
which the press freedom is endogenous even in the absence of censorship. They even 
provide evidence that press freedom in 1999, in terms of the index published by Freedom 
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House, is negatively correlated with political longevity, the length of time in office for 
the incumbent and the party who held power in 1997, after conditioning out region, real 
income per capita and population. Furthermore, the state ownership of news is positively 
correlated with corruption and political longevity but negatively with press freedom. So 
newspaper circulations can loosely approximate the general activeness of the press in a 
country. The more active the press is, the higher the degree of press freedom will be in 
that society, which implies higher level of government stability.  
Similarly, book titles represent not only the press freedom but also the 
accessibility of advanced knowledge in the society. Cheung (1982) suggests that concrete 
knowledge about operations of alternative institutional arrangements is a necessary 
condition for a socialist economy to transform into a free market economy. The more 
informed people are about institutional knowledge, the higher the possibility that 
institutional reforms can be carried out to promote economic growth. When book title per 
capita passes a threshold in a country, the society as a whole can be expected to have a 
relatively stable institution in operation. This argument may explain that the level of press 
freedom usually lags behind that of economic development in transitional economies.  
In CNTS, per capita newspaper circulation and per capita book titles published 
are selected as the operational stability measures for the above arguments, under the 
names of “News” and “Books” respectively. Figure 5 provides a visual evidence for the 
concave relationship between newspaper circulation per capita and economic growth rate. 
29 countries out of 45, whose newspaper circulation per capita is less than 0.8, had an 
average growth rate no greater than 3% between 1960 and 1973: Central African 
Republic, Nigeria, Mali, Benin, Naples, Cameroon, Togo, Senegal, Zaire, Uganda, Haiti, 
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Gambia, Kenya, Zambia, Sierra Leone, Indonesia, Jordan, Algeria, Philippines, 
Honduras, Bolivia, Fiji, Paraguay, Sri Lanka, Nicaragua, South Africa, El Salvador, 
Colombia, and Mauritius. Many African countries above acquired independence in the 
1960s and were still stabilizing the situation at the time. Within the range of newspaper 
circulation per capita between 0.08 and 0.28 are 10 countries growing at least at 5%: 
Taiwan, Korea, Greece, Barbados, Italy, Cyprus, Spain, Israel, Singapore and Austria. 
Except Uruguay, the countries that have at least 0.3 for “News” are OECD countries: The 
Netherlands, US, Finland, Denmark, Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, 
Japan, Iceland, UK and Sweden. Other than Japan growing at 8%, most economies grew 
at below 4% annually during the period.  
The last two columns in the top panel of Table 1 reports that “News” by having a 
linear term alone in Equation 1 has a coefficient barely significant at the 0.1 level and the 
coefficient of “Books” is not significant at all. Having a quadratic term and a linear one, 
however, the two measures have a concave effect with the positive linear coefficient and 
the negative quadratic coefficient statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The optimal 
level of newspaper circulation per capita is 0.33 and that of book titles is 0.0016. Nine 
countries have the value of “News” greater than the maximum level: Denmark, 
Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Israel, Japan, UK and Sweden. Only 
Iceland has a higher value for “Books” than the maximum level, 0.0032. Thus, most 
countries are relatively unstable given the values of “News” and “Books” are to the left 
side of the optimal levels.  
To check the robustness of the above concave effects from each other, I place 
multiple stability measures into the regression. Table 2 shows statistical results for 
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concave effects from seven combinations of “News”, “Books”, “Milisize”, “Milipop”, 
“Currency”, “Violence”, and “Nonvio.”  More than half of the multiple concave effects 
are statistically significant at the 0.01 level and the rest at the 0.05 level. The goodness of 
fit of five columns is above 0.6. Especially, the one for the combination of “News”, 
“Milisize” and “Currency” is as large as 0.702. Those R-squares are 50% higher than 
each of the individual concave effects in panel B of Table 1. In column 3, the proportion 
of the legislature seats held by the largest party, which is averaged over 1960-1973 and 
named “Seat”, has a concave effect on economic growth in addition to “News”, 
“Milipop” and “Currency”. All these multiple concave effects prove that each of the four 
types of measures – press freedom, currency stability, domestic conflicts and defense 
expenditure – reveals a unique aspect of government stability.  
 The results shown above are favorable evidence for the hypothesis that the 
government stability has a concave influence on economic growth. However, Hudson 
(1973) claims that the first edition of CNTS, which at the time was named Cross-Polity 
Time Series Data (CPTSD), though a milestone on the road to fruitful quantitative 
comparative political analysis, suffers from minor data inaccuracy problems in various 
data series, such as urbanization and political conflicts. However, I concur with Gurr’s 
(1974) suggestion that minor inaccuracies in political data are less likely to have 
significant impact on the general inferences drawn from cross-national studies. More 
troublesome is the possibility that errors are most likely to be gross and systematic within 
any individual dataset. My approach to this problem is to test the same hypothesis with 
multiple datasets. The aggregate dataset in World Handbook of Political and Social 
Indicators III: 1948 – 1982 (WHPSI hereafter) provides similar data series as CNTS [e.g. 
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Taylor & Jodice (1986)]. Though having more recent data by nine years, this aggregate 
dataset added entries at an interval of five years whereas CNTS did yearly. So it is 
reasonable to use the analysis in WHPSI to test robustness of the concave effects in 
CNTS. Next, I will present the evidence of concave effects from WHPSI over the period 
of 1960-1982.  
I first confirm the concave effects of “Defcap”, “Milipop” and “Milisize” in 
CNTS dataset with three similar measures in WHSPI: defense expenditure as a 
percentage of GNP (“Defexp”), military size (“Milisize2”), and military manpower per 
thousand working age population (“Milipop2”). As three variables are available in 1965, 
1970 and 1975, the average of three data points is used in Equation 1. In the first 3 
columns of table 3, the linear terms of those measures are positive and significant at the 
0.01 level, while their quadratic terms have negative coefficients significant at the same 
level. Among control variables, only secondary school attainment is not significant but 
close to the 0.1 level.  
Similarly, I select three measures of press freedom in WHSPI: news circulation 
per thousand people (“News2”), radios per thousand people (“Radio”), and TV sets per 
thousand people (“TV”). Each measure is recorded every five years in 1960, 1965, 1970 
and 1975. I use the average of four observations in Equation 1. Three measures do have a 
concave effect on the growth rate because each has a positive linear term and a negative 
quadratic term as shown in Table 3. The coefficients are statistically significant at the 
0.01 level for “News2” as well as for “TV”, and at the 0.05 level for “Radio.”  
“Seat2” in Table 3 is the proportion of the legislature seats held by the largest 
party in 1975 recorded in WHSPI. In spite of one observation in each country for the 
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measure, the results of “Seat2” confirm the concave effects of “Seat” in Table 2 by 
having statistically significant linear and quadratic terms with the expected signs.  
 All measures that have been presented in this section are by and large coarse 
measures of government stability. Only statistical evidence of the coefficient of linear 
and quadratic terms is reported to prove the concave effects of each measure. The 
quantitative meaning of the coefficients has limited practical implication and thus 
remains untouched. Next, the paper will proceed to the statistical evidence for the convex 
effects. 
V. Convex Effects of Encompassing Interests 
 
In this section, I report the convex effects of encompassing interests. We still use 
the same regression model as Equation 1 to investigate the relationship between 
encompassing interest and economic performance by only replacing stability measures 
with measures of encompassing interests, which is as follows:  
Yi = β0 + β1 (EI i) + β2 (EI i) 
2 + Xi’ γ + εi    (2) 
The subscript i represents countries and “EI” stands for encompassing interests. The 
measures of encompassing interests are also from Cross-National Time Series Dataset 
(CNTS hereafter) for the period 1960 – 73.  
Three variables in CNTS have convex effects on economic growth for a sample of 
33 countries given the data availability: voter as a percentage of population, cabinet 
changes and effective executive changes, which are named as “Cabinet”, “Executive”, 
and “Voter”, respectively. Cabinet changes is defined as the number of times in a year 
that a new premier is named and (or) new ministers occupy at least 50% of the cabinet 
posts. The change in effective executive is the number of times in a year that effective 
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control of the executive power changes hands requiring that the new executive be 
independent of his predecessor. In Equation 2, I use as the EI measures the sum of 
“Cabinet” and “Executive”, as well as the average of “Voter” over the 14-year sample 
period. A negative coefficient on the linear term and a positive on the nonlinear term are 
expected to serve as the evidence of the convex effects. 
The cabinet is the most influential functional group on economic policies in 
government. A high turnover rate in a cabinet is normally expected to be detrimental to 
economic growth since the uncertainty about the orientation of economic policies will 
become severe. Lavar and Shepsle (1996 and 1999) present a provocative portfolio 
allocation (PA) model to explain government formation and survival in parliamentary 
democracy. The key insight of the PA model is that forecasts about the future policy 
orientation of candidate cabinet ministers drive the bargaining over the allocation of 
cabinet positions and a coalition agreement on policy. Thus, I propose that the turnover 
rate of cabinet members could imply an active refinement of economic and social policies 
in government. Like private investors constantly changing the composition of their 
portfolios in the hope of achieving higher expected investment returns, governments 
could intentionally reshuffle the allocation of political power internally to improve 
economic growth for the encompassing interests behind them. Regarding “Voter”, the 
proportion of voters in the population indicates the overall sentiment of the whole 
population towards the political system as well as the quality of the government elected 
out of the system. Only above a certain threshold, the higher the percentage of the 
population willing to participate in a political system, the better the economic growth 
should be.  
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Table 4 reports the results for three measures. In column1, “Voter” as expected 
has a negative linear term and positive quadratic term that are both statistically significant 
at the 0.1 level.  When the convex effect of “Voter” is taken into account, “Cabinet” and 
“Effective”, as shown in column 2 and 3, have the significant convex effects at the 0.05 
level. Moreover, all control variables are statistically significant at the 0.01 level across 
three specifications. Concerning the turning point of the convex effects, it is 0.31 for 
“Voter”, 6 for “Cabinet”, and 4 for “Executive”.  
VI. Polynomial Effects of Stability and Encompassing Interests  
I propose in section 2 that government stability and encompassing interest might 
together have a polynomial influence on economy, which is illustrated as a W-shaped 
curve in figure 3. Before testing the W-curve, I first check whether government stability 
and encompassing interests have individual polynomial effects on economic growth. I 
include a cubic term of the stability measures previously used into Equation 1. The model 
changes as follows:  
Yi = β0 + β1 (Stability i) + β2 (Stability i) 
2 + β2 (Stability i) 
3 + Xi’ γ + εi (3) 
 β1, β2 and β3 are expected to be positive, negative and positive, respectively. The concave 
polynomial effects of government stability connote that a high level of government 
stability, other than decreasing economic growth, might in the meantime help 
encompassing interests evolve and the latter eventually have a dominant effect on the 
economy. The net effect of two forces at a high degree of stability can be positive.  
 Similarly, I add to Equation 2 a cubic term of encompassing interest measures. 
The new model is as follows: 
Yi = β0 + β1 (EI i) + β2 (EI i) 
2 + β2 (EI i) 
3 + Xi’ γ + εi  (4) 
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This time β1, β2 and β3 are expected to be negative, positive and negative. The rationale 
behind the convex polynomial effects of encompassing interests is that once it has a 
positive effect on economic growth after exceeding a threshold level, the government 
stability is expected to be increasing along with growing encompassing interests. 
However, if encompassing interests continue to grow upon accomplishing a temporary 
maximal growth rate, the negative effect of the government stability as argued in section 
2 can also become dominant. The net effect on the economy is going to be negative until 
the encompassing interests attain an even higher level to surmount the negative influence 
of excessive government stability as discussed above.  
I use a ‘horizontal’ method to test the W-curve based on the polynomial effects of 
stability and encompassing interests. According to the arguments of the individual 
polynomial effects, the two concepts actually are just the two sides of the same token 
over a specific range of the degree of stability and of the level of encompassing interests. 
Thus, the polynomial curve of stability and that of encompassing interests, overlapping at 
the concave part of the two, comprise a W-shaped curve. The empirical test needs to use 
three “Stability” terms as in Equation 3 and the three “EI” terms as in Equation 4 in the 
same cross section regression, which has the form as follows:  
Yi = β0 + β1 (Stability i) + β2 (Stability i) 
2 + β3 (Stability i) 
3 + β4 (EI i) + β5 (EI i) 
2 
+ β5 (EI i) 
3   +Xi’ γ + εi     (5) 
 Then the W-curve will be proved when β1, β3 as well as β5 are positive, and β2, β4, plus β6 
are negative. In general, the polynomial effects explain economic growth rate more 
thoroughly than the simple concave and convex effects. The goodness of fit of the 
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regression also improves substantially. The results for the polynomial effects and the W-
curve are presented for both types of measure from CNTS.  
In Table 5, four stability measures – “News”, “Book”, “Milisize”, and “Milipop” 
– have the linear, quadratic and cubic terms that are significant at the 0.01 level. The 
terms of “Seat” are significant at the 0.05 level. The R-squares of the five specifications 
are above 0.4, about 50% higher than those of their concave effects in the panel b of 
Table 1. The last column of Table 5 presents the results of the variable named as “MCS,” 
the mean cabinet size between 1960 and 1973 across countries. Its linear and cubic terms 
are negative and quadratic term is positive. All three terms are statistically significant at 
the 0.01 level. The “MCS” is a new measure of encompassing interests discovered by the 
polynomial effect test. The results for the nonlinear effect of “MCS” are not significant.  
Table 6 confirms that the polynomial effects of stability measures are robust to 
each other. Each pair of the stability measures generates two sets of statistically 
significant polynomial coefficients, and more than half of them are at the 0.01 level. The 
goodness of fit of the specifications continues to improve with an average value of 0.5, 
25% more than the average 0.4 in table 5.  
The evidence of the W-curve from CNTS is in table 7. The last three columns of 
the table are the results of the “horizontal” method. “News”, “Milisize” and “Seat”, when 
paired with “MCS”, generate six polynomial terms significant at the 0.01 level, of which 
three are positive and the rest are negative.  
VII. Conclusion 
The paper develops three hypotheses for how government stability and 
encompassing interests influence economic growth across countries. I provide statistical 
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evidence of the concave effects by government stability as well as the convex effects by 
encompassing interest on economic growth. Meanwhile, I develop the rationale for a 
variety of government stability and encompassing interest measures. Furthermore, I 
extend the arguments for the nonlinear effects to imply the polynomial effects and prove 
that eventually the concave and convex effects together comprise a W-curve in the 
economic development trend across countries. 
Those nonlinear and polynomial effects of cross-country economic performance 
have two implications. First, economic development is a complicated process of multiple 
dimensions so that the time is right to abandon the simple single-dimensional as well as 
linear growth models, especially the ‘AK’ model. Second, our knowledge about 
institutional characteristics across countries is still very limited. The research on the 
driving force behind the formation of encompassing interests and also the maintenance of 
government stability should be promising. 
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Figure 1: The Concave Relationship between Economic Growth and Stability 
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Figure 2: The Convex Relationship between Economic Growth and Encompassing 
Interest 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
Expected
Economic
Growth Rate
Index of Encompassing Interests
10,000
 
 28 
 
Figure 3: The Level of Optimal Stability under the Constraint of Encompassing Interests 
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Figure 4: The Concave Effect of the Average Currency Age 
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Figure 5: The Concave Effect of Newspaper Circulation Per Capita 
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Table 1 
Cross-Country OLS Estimation for Stability Effects: Growth = Real GDP Growth per Worker 
Data Source: Cross-National Time Series (1960 – 1973) 
 Panel A:  1 2  3 4 5  6  7  
 Currency Nonviol Violence DefCap Milipop Milisize News 
        
Intercept 0.015 0.019 0.019 0.025 0.022 0.022 0.025 
 3.23 4.58 3.97 4.69 5.42 5.15 5.83 
        
Real GDP Per Capita 
(1960) -2.56E-06 -2.40E-06 -2.17E-06 -3.26E-06 -2.45E-06 -2.62E-06 -4.02E-06 
 -3.67 -3.34 -2.92 -3.23 -3.32 -3.49 -3.32 
        
Invest/GDP (1960) 0.0012 0.001 0.001 0.0013 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 4.63 4.33 4.39 3.36 4.15 3.98 4.54 
        
Secondary School 0.0005 0.00052 0.00055 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0003 
In the Pop Over Age 25 1.71 1.56 1.65 1.09 1.54 1.53 1.17 
        
Stability 5.82E-05 0.0001 9.60E-05 6.57E-05 0.182 1.04E-05 0.06* 
 3.06 1.72 1.09 0.69 1.15 1.66 1.88 
        
R-Square 0.362 0.324 0.313 0.262 0.32 0.335 0.335 
Number of Countries 75 75 74 57 69 69 72 
 
 
 Panel B:  1 2  3 4 5 6 7 
 Currency Nonvio Violence DefCap Milipop Milisize News 
        
Intercept 0.011 0.016 0.016 0.024 0.018 0.019 0.02 
 1.92 3.51 3.09 4.58 4.65 4.91 5.44 
        
Real GDP Per Capita 
(1960) -2.68E-06 -2.29E-06 -2.18E-06 -5.21E-06 -3.54E-06 -2.76E-06 -5.34E-06 
 -3.88 -3.12 -2.85 -3.65 -4.1 -3.88 -4.13 
        
Invest/GDP (1960) 0.0012 0.001 0.0011 0.0013 0.001 0.001 0.00087 
 4.81 4.56 4.34 3.3 4.25 4.56 5.67 
        
Secondary School 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0007 0.0007 5.75E-05 
In the Pop Over Age 25 1.49 1.87 1.78 1.49 2.26 2.25 0.188 
        
Stability 0.00016 0.00035 0.0004 0.00067 1.773 5.03E-05 0.284 
 2.54 2.24 2.19 2.08 2.61 2.62 3.44 
        
Stability
2
 -2.83E-07 -1.25E-06 -3.26E-06 -3.83E-06 -17.4 -1.65E-08 -0.433 
 -1.95 -1.99 -2.44 -2.2 -2.66 -2.59 -3.38 
        
R-Square 0.384 0.355 0.344 0.347 0.432 0.409 0.447 
Number of Countries 75 75 74 57 69 69 72 
Note: In each case t-test based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors is given below. Bold denotes coefficients 
are significant at the 0.05 level or less; italic denotes coefficients are significant between the 0.05 level and the 0.1 level.  
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Table 2 
Cross-Country OLS Estimation for Stability Effects: Growth = Real GDP Growth per Worker 
Data Source: Cross-National Time Series (1960 – 1973) 
             
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Measure 1 (M1) News News News News News News 
Measure 2 (M2) MilitaryPop Currency MilitaryPop MilitaryPop Currency Currency 
Measure 3 (M3) Currency Nonvio Currency Currency Milisize Violence 
Measure 4 (M4)   Seat Nonvio   
       
Intercept 0.008 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.0066 0.004 
 1.55 0.587 -0.16 -0.359 1.41 0.66 
       
Real GDP Per Capita 
(1960) -6.68E-06 -6.33E-06 -6.10E-06 -6.40E-06 -6.48E-06 -6.22E-06 
 -6.28 -5.38 -5.58 -5.71 -6.32 -5.51 
       
Invest/GDP (1960) 0.0009 0.0009 0.001 0.001 0.0009 0.001 
 6.53 6.62 6.24 6.46 7.45 6.56 
       
Secondary School 
Attainment 0.0001 -1.17E-06 -0.0001 -6.13E-06 0.0002 -4.19E-05 
In the Pop Over Age 25 0.435 -0.004 -0.39 -0.019 0.97 -0.165 
       
M1 0.267 0.3 0.256 0.257 0.261 0.303 
 3.55 3.95 3.22 3.05 3.43 3.89 
       
M1
2
 -0.393 -0.453 -0.374 -0.366 -0.398 -0.456 
 -3.23 -4.01 -3.01 -2.83 -3.45 -3.94 
       
M2 1.162 0.0002 1.477 1.175 0.00015 2.00E-04 
 2.03 3.13 3.31 2.33 2.87 3.02 
       
M2
2
 -11.19 -3.63E-07 -13.58 -10.56 -2.49E-07 -3.90E-07 
 -2.04 -2.62 -3.22 -2.2 -2.11 -2.65 
       
M3 1.50E-04 3.00E-04 0.00014 1.60E-04 0.00012 4.00E-04 
 2.49 2.73 2.35 2.63 5.35 2.35 
       
M3
2
 -2.72E-07 -1.10E-06 -2.63E-07 -2.98E-07 -1.48E-07 -3.90E-07 
 -1.99 -2.35 -1.93 -2.18 -5.21 -2.65 
       
M4   1.30E-04 2.00E-04   
   1.77 1.86   
       
M4
2
   -4.22E-07 -9.00E-07   
   -2.33 -1.84   
       
R-Square 0.614 0.602 0.642 0.66 0.705 0.585 
Number of Countries 67 72 67 67 66 71 
             
Note: In each case t-test based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors is given below. Bold denotes 
coefficients are significant at the 0.05 level or less; italic denotes coefficients are significant between the 0.05 level and the 
0.1 level.  
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Table 3 
Cross-Country OLS Estimation for Stability Effects: Growth = Real GDP Growth per Worker 
Data Source: World Handbook of Political and Social Indicator (1960 – 1982) 
            
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 DefExp Milisize2 MiliPop2 News2 TV Radio Seat2 
        
Intercept 0.017 0.019 0.015 0.024 0.032 0.025 0.018 
 4.92 6.59 4.87 3.64 7.65 5.37 4.096 
        
Real GDP Per Capita (1960) -2.01E-06 -2.00E-06 -2.39E-06 -3.95E-06 -6.33E-06 -4.46E-06 -2.53E-06 
 -4.3 -4.55 -5.03 -4.39 -3.69 -4.56 -4.3 
        
Invest/GDP (1960) 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.00036 0.00041 0.00071 0.00056 
 5.38 6.1 6.18 1.69 3.58 3.82 4.18 
        
Secondary School Attainment 0.0004 0.0005 0.00038 0.00016 0.0003 0.00043 0.00049 
In the Pop Over Age 25 1.56 2.29 1.44 0.797 1.46 2.01 1.82 
        
Stability 0.003 4.06E-05 0.0015 0.0002 0.0003 7.18E-05 0.042 
 2.96 2.84 4.73 3.38 3.8 2.62 1.97 
        
Stability
2
 -0.0001 -1.51E-08 -1.91E-05 -2.94E-07 -5.78E-07 -3.78E-08 -0.034 
 -2.73 -3.17 -3.9 -2.99 -3.24 -2.39 -1.65 
        
R-Square 0.34 0.398 0.475 0.253 0.491 0.367 0.251 
Number of Countries 69 70 70 50 59 62 70 
            
 
Note: In each case t-test based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors is given below. Bold denotes coefficients are 
significant at the 0.05 level or less; italic denotes coefficients are significant between the 0.05 level and the 0.1 level.  
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Table 4 
Cross-Country OLS Estimation for Encompassing Interest Effects: Growth = Real GDP Growth 
per Worker 
Data Source: Cross-National Time Series (1960 – 1973) 
        
 1 2 3 
    
Intercept 0.039 0.043 0.04 
 4.44 4.35 4.05 
    
Real GDP Per Capita (1960) -3.34E-06 -3.13E-06 -3.19E-06 
 -3.43 -4.23 -3.57 
    
Invest/GDP (1960) 0.001 0.0007 0.0009 
 3.3 2.65 3.05 
    
Secondary School Attainment 0.0002 0.0005 0.0005 
In the Pop Over Age 25 0.83 2.22 2.4 
    
Voter -0.089 -0.042 -0.049 
 -1.67 -0.84 -0.99 
    
Voter
2
 0.142 0.076 0.088 
 1.93 1.19 1.28 
    
Cabinet  -0.004  
  -1.95  
    
Cabinet
2
  0.00036  
  3.31  
    
Executive   -0.004 
   -1.71 
    
Executive
2
   0.0005 
   2.5 
    
R-Square 0.5 0.064 0.59 
Number of Countries 33 33 33 
Note: In each case t-test based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors is given below. Bold denotes 
coefficients are significant at the 0.05 level or less; italic denotes coefficients are significant between the 0.05 level and the 
0.1 level.  
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Table 5 
Cross-Country OLS Estimation for W-Curve: Growth = Real GDP Growth per Worker 
Data Source: Cross-National Time Series (1960 – 1973) 
 
              
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  News Book DefCap Milisize Seat Milipop MSC 
        
Intercept 0.0155 0.016 0.022 0.0178 0.007 0.015 0.129 
 3.15 3.34 4.04 4.66 0.777 4.02 3.64 
        
Real GDP Per Capita (1960) -4.92E-06 -4.26E-06 -5.21E-06 -3.32E-06 -1.82E-06 -3.21E-06 -2.97E-06 
  -3.64 -5.02 -3.77 -5.55 -2.07 -3.9 -4.11 
        
Invest/GDP (1960) 0.0009 0.0011 0.0012 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 6.24 3.83 3.27 5.29 4.15 4.61 4.99 
        
Secondary School Attainment 0.0002 -4.64E-05 0.0005 0.0008 0.0006 0.0006 0.0008 
In the Pop Over Age 25 (1960) 0.596 -0.16 1.40 2.89 1.56 1.7 2.23 
        
Linear Term 0.461 184.3 0.0011 0.0002 0.0003 2.74 -0.02 
  4.29 5.38 2.47 5.04 2 3.29 -3.28 
        
Quadratic Term -1.565 -2.13-E05 -1.05E-05 -2.69E-07 -2.13E-06 -59.28 0.001 
 -2.95 -4.79 -2.66 -4.81 -2.04 -3.51 3.32 
        
Cubic Term 1.64 48635135 2.48E-08 7.42E-11 3.46E-09 327.7 -1.88E-05 
 2.21 4.55 2.77 4.75 1.96 3.16 -3.19 
        
R-Square 0.485 0.512 0.381 0.523 0.337 0.466 0.419 
Number of Countries 72 65 61 69 75 69 75 
              
 
Note: In each case t-test based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors is given below. Bold denotes coefficients are 
significant at the 0.05 level or less; italic denotes coefficients are significant between the 0.05 level and the 0.1 level.  
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Table 6 
Cross-Country OLS Estimation for W-Curve: Growth = Real GDP Growth per Worker 
Data Source: Cross-National Time Series (1960 – 1973) 
 
 
 
            
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Stability Measure 1 (stab1) News News News Seat Seat Seat 
Stability Measure 2 (stab2) Milisize Seat Defcap Milisize Milipop Defcap 
            
Intercept 0.0135 0.011 0.016 0.005 -0.009 -0.0004 
 3.15 1.26 2.78 0.63 -0.877 -0.041 
       
Real GDP Per Capita (1960) -5.80E-06 -4.69E-06 -7.16E-06 -3.02E-06 -3.45E-06 -6.21E-06 
  -4.73 -3.44 -5.86 -3.71 -4.01 -5.63 
       
Invest/GDP (1960) 0.00085 0.0008 0.0008 0.00097 0.0011 0.001 
 6.81 6.63 2.58 4.98 4.57 2.62 
       
Secondary School Attainment 0.0003 0.0004 0.00000351 0.0008 0.0006 0.0007 
In the Pop Over Age 25 (1960) 1.2 1.21 0.01 2.71 1.73 2.029 
       
stab1 0.376 0.532 0.469 0.0003 0.0005 0.0006 
  3.45 5.27 3.02 1.96 2.41 3.11 
       
stab1
2
 -1.15 -1.85 -1.55 -1.98-E06 -2.83E-06 -3.4E-06 
 -2.39 -3.66 -2.09 -1.92 -2.13 -3.19 
       
stab1
3
 1.11 1.99 1.66 3.22E-09 4.44E-09 5.58E-09 
 1.71 2.71 1.72 1.78 1.89 3.14 
       
stab2 0.0001 0.0003 0.0009 0.0002 3.25 0.0014 
 5.92 1.71 2.39 5.21 5.13 4.72 
       
stab2
2
 -2.23E-07 -2.33E-06 -9.41E-06 -2.76E-07 -73.69 -1.25E-05 
 -5.59 -2.79 -2.77 -5.03 -3.98 -4.21 
       
stab2
3
 6.2E-11 4.49E-09 2.34E-08 7.64E-11 424.92 2.85E-08 
 5.54 3.2 2.95 4.97 3.04 3.96 
       
R-Square 0.652 0.553 0.574 0.554 0.54 0.47 
Number of Countries 67 72 59 69 69 61 
            
 
Note: In each case t-test based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors is given below. Bold denotes coefficients are 
significant at the 0.05 level or less; italic denotes coefficients are significant between the 0.05 level and the 0.1 level.  
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Table 7 
Cross-Country OLS Estimation for W-Curve: Growth = Real GDP Growth per Worker 
Data Source: Cross-National Time Series (1960 – 1973) 
 
       
 1 2 3 
Stability  (stab) Seat Milisize News 
Encompassing Interests  (EI) MCS MCS MCS 
     
Intercept 0.118 0.111 0.118 
 3.47 3.49 4.12 
    
Real GDP Per Capita (1960) -2.94E-06 -3.90E-06 -5.51E-06 
  -3.4 -5.65 -3.76 
    
Invest/GDP (1960) 0.0011 0.0009 0.0008 
 4.69 5.42 6.91 
    
Secondary School Attainment 0.0009 0.0009 0.0004 
In the Pop Over Age 25 (1960) 2.46 2.89 1.299 
    
stab 0.0004 0.0002 0.408 
  3.04 4.49 3.81 
    
stab
2
 -2.48E-06 -2.39E-07 -1.345 
 -2.8 -4.54 -3.05 
    
stab
3
 4.19E-09 6.63E-11 1.379 
 2.61 4.58 2.31 
    
EI -0.021 -0.017 -0.019 
 -3.42 -3.07 -3.877 
    
EI
2
 0.0012 9.00E-04 0.001 
 3.44 3.13 4.06 
    
EI
3
 -1.96E-05 -1.59E-05 -1.82E-05 
 -3.3 -3.08 -4.001 
    
R-Square 0.462 0.591 0.577 
Number of Countries 75 69 72 
    
 
Note: In each case t-test based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors is given below. Bold 
denotes coefficients are significant at the 0.05 level or less; italic denotes coefficients are significant between 
the 0.05 level and the 0.1 level.  
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  Chapter 2 
Finding an Optimal Sequence of Capital Account Liberalization 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Capital account liberalization has been a popular economic policy embraced 
by developing countries over the last two decades and will likely continue to be in this 
century. Most developing countries that liberalized capital accounts in the 1980s and 
1990s experienced at early stages of liberalization a large volume of capital inflows 
and temporary economic boom. The downside of these policies was that, due to a loss 
of confidence by international investors and lack of sound domestic policies towards 
foreign investment, capital inflows can transform into capital flight quickly and leave 
behind countries in either balance-of-payment crises or full-scale financial crises. To 
maximize the benefits while minimizing the risks of capital account liberalization, 
sequencing the liberalization, which is relaxing restrictions on capital accounts 
transaction step by step over a certain period of time, has been actively considered by 
countries and international financial institutions. Existing empirical results on the 
optimal sequence of capital account liberalization are mainly case studies for 
individual countries (Johnson, Darbar and Echeverria, 1997). One reason for the lack 
of systematic analysis across countries may be absence of operational indicators that 
incorporate the intensity for different components of capital account liberalization.  
This paper contributes to the extant literature on sequencing capital account 
liberalizations in two areas. First, I construct liberalization intensity indicators for 
three major types of capital account transactions – banking transactions, portfolio 
investment transactions, and direct investment transactions by using recently available 
IMF disaggregated restriction measures for specific capital account transactions. 
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Minianes (2004) compiles a set of dummies corresponding to the on/off status of 
restrictions on 12 subcategories of capital account transactions in 33 countries over 
the period of 1984 to 2000, based on the record of the IMF Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER hereafter). I collapse 
12 subcategory transactions into three major ones: banking, portfolio investment, and 
direct investment; and then average the value of dummies in each group as their 
restriction intensity measure. The annual change of the restriction measure is the 
intensity indicator of liberalization in each area. 
Second, my paper is a step towards testing the optimal liberalization sequence 
more directly. By using these liberalization intensity indices, I find in a multiplicative 
interaction model that the optimal capital account liberalization sequence is to 
liberalize portfolio investment transactions 5 years and direct investment transactions 
one year before banking transactions. As shown in a traditional Solow-style growth 
regression model, the optimal sequence is correlated with an annual 0.6 percentage 
point higher growth rate in the 1990s.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II gives an overview of the related 
literature. Section III introduces liberalization indicators for three types of capital 
account liberalizations. Section IV presents the empirical test and the discussion of 
the results. Section V concludes the study.   
 
II. An Overview of Related Literature 
Depending upon the choice of the liberalization indicators and the 
specification of the empirical models, the existing literature provides conflicting 
results on the growth effect of capital account liberalization. Quinn (1997), Edwards 
(2004), Klein and Olivei (2006), Chanda (2005), Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz 
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(2001), Henry (2001) and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2004) provide supporting 
evidence. Rodrik (1998) is the widely cited paper finding no significant effect. Quinn 
(1997) is one of the first attempts to construct the indicator catching the intensity of 
capital controls and it has been widely used since. Quinn’s indicator of capital account 
openness ranges between the cardinal number of 0 and 4 with an increment of 0.5, 
where 0 indicates full-scale control and 4 represents free of restrictions. The indicator 
is available for 21 OECD countries from 1950 to 1997 and for 43 developing 
countries for the years 1958, 1973, and 1988. Quinn (1997) continues to show that the 
change of Quinn’s indicator between 1958 and 1988, as an intensity measure of 
capital account liberalization, is positively correlated with the growth rate of real GDP 
per capita over the same span of time in a sample of 58 countries. Edison, Klein, 
Ricci, and Sløk (2004) tabulate Quinn’s measure collapsed in two groups at the value 
of 2 with the on/off indicator of capital controls on the IMF AREAER and find that 
the two indicators show the same trend of liberalization across countries from the 
1950s to the 1990s.  
Klein and Olivei (2006) find in a sample of 95 countries that countries doing 
capital account liberalization between 1975 and 1995 observed more financial depth 
first, which leads to faster growth. The financial depth measures used in their study 
are the ratio of liquidity liabilities to GDP and the ratio of private credit to GDP. The 
liberalization indicator is the proportion of years in which countries have free capital 
mobility based on the on/off indicator in IMF AREAER. However, the results are 
mainly driven by the presence of 21 OECD countries in the sample.  
Edwards (2001), in a sample of 60 countries, find that the level of Quinn’s 
indicator in the 1980s and the change of the indicator from the 1970s to 1980s are 
strongly associated with the growth of real per capita income. Furthermore, he tests 
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the variation of growth effect of the liberalization across countries of different per 
capita income levels by adding an interactive term between Quinn’s index and the 
logarithm of income per capita of 1980. The term has a positive coefficient, implying 
that the marginal growth effect of capital account is an increasing function of the 
strength of an economy in 1980. Thus, the liberalization unleashes solid economic 
growth in rich industrial countries as well as middle-income countries but not to the 
same degree in poor countries. Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz (2001) argue that 
the difference in the effect of capital account liberalization across countries is 
determined by the degree of macroeconomic stability, which is measured by the black 
market premium. Chanda (2005) suggests that the impact of opening the capital 
account may fluctuate with the number of entrenched interest groups in a country 
approximated by the level of ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity.  
On the other hand, in a sample of almost 100 countries, Rodrik (1998) finds no 
relationship between the liberalization and the growth rate of real income per capita 
between 1975 and1989 after including an indicator of governmental institutions. 
Capital account liberalization only signals institution quality. One potential drawback 
to his empirical analysis is that the average investment rate over the period, a key 
variable in most cross-sectional growth regressions, is missing with no explicit 
explanation.  
In addition to the work on the effect of the overall capital account 
liberalization, a separate line of literature finds a clear-cut growth effect of equity 
market liberalization. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2004) examine the impact of 
stock market liberalization on economic growth by using the official equity market 
liberalization date for 95 countries between 1980 and 1997. The liberalization date 
indicator equals one if there is convincing evidence that foreigners can directly 
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engage in the local equity market and zero otherwise. This indicator incorporates no 
intensity of liberalization. The three signs used in the study are: a launching of a 
country fund, an American Depositary Receipt (ADR) announcement, and an official 
liberalization declaration. The equity market liberalization on average leads to 1 
percent increase in annual per capita GDP growth over a five-year post-liberalization 
period. In addition, Henry (2000) finds stock market liberalization leads to temporary 
investment booms in a sample of 11 developing countries.  
The conventional view of sequencing capital account liberalization 
emphasizes the importance of preconditions for the reform. Developing countries 
should take in account as well the stability of the overall economy and the strength of 
domestic financial institutions before implementing any liberalization policy. 
Furthermore, those countries should liberalize the current account and domestic 
financial system before seriously considering opening capital accounts (McKinnon 
1973, 1982; Frenkel 1982). The capital flows’ contribution to economic growth is 
contingent on the depth and strength of the domestic financial market.  
However, governments usually have incentives to repress the domestic 
financial market through capital controls rather than to improve domestic financial 
institutions to facilitate capital account liberalization. For instance, the restrictions on 
capital flows make the domestic interest rate lower than the world market rate and 
allow the domestic public debt to be financed at a lower cost. Edwards and Tabellini 
(1991) find that governments turn to an inflation tax on domestic capital when tax 
evasion is widespread and the collection cost is high. In a panel of twenty OECD and 
seventy-one non-OECD countries over the period 1967-1992, Leblang (1997) shows 
that countries, in the middle of either financial repression, fixed exchange rate regime, 
or balance-of-payments crisis, usually have in place tight capital controls. 
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Furthermore, achieving the preconditions according to the conventional view 
for a successful outcome from capital account liberalization, transparent domestic 
financial market and efficient financial institutions, is a very challenging task even for 
industrial countries. The banking crises during the early 1990s in the United States, 
Scandinavia, and Japan, which are noted for relatively high quality institutions in their 
economic systems, illustrate that designing an adequate set of prudential and 
regulatory controls on domestic financial systems is always easier said than done 
(Stiglitz, 2000).  
An alternative view of sequencing favors early capital account liberalization as 
a catalyst for broader economic reforms and a means of overcoming vested interests’ 
opposition to comprehensive financial reforms. Bartolini and Drazen (1997a) argue 
that governments less dependent on inflation and seinoirage tax collection strategies 
can differentiate themselves easily from financially repressive governments by 
opening capital account early as a signal of future efficient investment policies. In 
addition, Bartolini and Drazen (1997b) claim that developing countries would expect 
capital inflows and consequently seek capital account convertibility when the world 
interest rate is low. In the time of rising world rates, however, only sufficiently 
committed countries will stick to capital account liberalization and expect 
uninterrupted capital inflows. Capital account liberalization can break the vicious 
circle of domestic financial repression and initiate a virtuous cycle for a 
comprehensive financial liberalization that is both credible and sustainable.  
I share the second sequencing view on early capital account liberalization. A 
large number of countries have had strong entrenched interests in their domestic 
financial markets during the twentieth century (Rajan and Zingales 2003). Given the 
widespread current account liberalization in a large number of economies, the 
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effectiveness of capital account restriction gradually declines and capital controls 
become less lucrative to the special interests. And capital inflows after the breakdown 
of the control bring in competition to domestic financial markets and improve their 
efficiency. As a result, capital account liberalization can be an integral breakthrough 
for a comprehensive financial reform. The main empirical result in this paper is to 
identify an optimal liberalization sequence among different types of capital 
transactions that would promote, or at least does not undermine, growth.  
 
III.  The Liberalization Indicators of Three Types of Capital 
Transactions 
I construct the liberalization intensity measures for various types of capital 
account transactions from a recently available set of measures on capital account 
restrictions in Miniane (2004). Since its 1996 edition, the IMF Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) provides dummies on 
13 subcategories of capital account transactions:  
1. Capital market securities: shares or other securities of a participating nature, 
and bond and other securities with an original maturity of more than one year.  
2. Money market instruments: securities with an original maturity of one year or 
less, such as certificates of deposit, Treasury bills, and so forth.  
3. Collective investment securities: share certificates or any evidence of investor 
interest in an institution for collective investment, such as mutual funds.  
4. Derivatives and other instruments: refers to operations in other negotiable 
instruments and nonsecuritized claims not covered under the previous three 
items.  
5. Commercial credits: covers operations directly linked to international trade 
transaction. 
6. Financial credits: credits other than commercial credits.  
7. Guarantees, sureties, and financial backup facilities; securities pledged for 
payment of a contract, such as warrants, letters of credit, and so on.  
8. Direct investment.  
9. Repatriation of profits or liquidation of direct investment.  
10. Real estate transactions.  
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11. Provision specific to commercial banks and other credit institutions: 
regulations that are specific to these institutions, such as monetary and 
prudential controls.  
12. Provisions specific to institutional investors: one common example is a limit 
on the share of the institution’s portfolio that may be held in foreign assets  
13. Multiple exchange rate arrangement. (Miniane 2004, p.282). 
 
The dummy for each subcategory equals 1 if the transaction is regulated. The indices 
account for restrictions on both inflows and outflows without explicitly discriminating 
between the two.  
Miniane (2004) uses the text in the pre-1996 editions of AREAER to fill out 
the dummies for the 13 subcategories back to 1983. Due to a lack of consistent 
information on personal capital movement, however, he replaces the dummy for the 
subcategory 11 with a dummy for multiple exchange rate arrangements also tracked 
by the IMF AREAER. In the end, the dataset provides a rule-based measure of 13 
subcategory capital account restrictions for 33 countries, 23 of which are OECD 
countries and 10 of which are developing countries, from 1983 to 2000.The average 
of 13 dummies can serve as a measure of intensity of capital controls with an increase 
of 0.0769 (1 / 13 = 0.0769). For a few countries in some years, the increase is not 
uniformly 0.076 due to one or two missing dummies. A value being close to 1 means 
there are restrictions on most of the 13 subcategory transactions. The overall 
restriction indicator focuses the extent of controls across different transactions rather 
than on the relative importance of a particular subcategory control. 
Table 1 gives summary statistics of the restriction measure for all 33 countries. 
The18-year mean ranges from as low as 0.0769 (UK) to as high as 0.97 (Brazil). 
Columns 2 to 4 report the standard deviation ranging from 0 (Malaysia) to 0.363 
(Greece), the maximum value of indicator being1, representing full-scale controls 
(Brazil, Chile, and Colombia), and the minimum is 0.0769, meaning capital controls 
on just one subcategory transaction (Switzerland, Denmark, UK, Germany, Greece, 
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Hong Kong, and the Netherlands). The last column gives the percentage change 
between the maximum and the minimum of capital account restrictions. Greece and 
Denmark have the two largest swings in the intensity of capital control. The former 
had a 91% change and the latter an 88% change. UK and Malaysia have the most 
tranquil trend among 33 countries with a 0% and a 0.69% change between the two 
extreme scenarios, which means the level of capital controls does not change in the 
sample period. 
Figure 1 plots the variation of the average of dummies as the overall 
restriction level over the sample period in Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, France, Greece, 
and Japan. A wide variation of capital controls exists across countries. Argentina and 
Greece both began in 1983 with a value above 0.9, which means nearly full-scale 
control, but lifted many restrictions during the next eighteen years to reach a low level 
of 0.4 and 0.1 respectively in 2000. Brazil had a full-scale capital control until 1996 
and the indicator only decreased slightly to 0.846 in 2000. Belgium, France and Japan 
had an average indicator at 0.7 in 1983, and then the value slowly dropped to 0.15, 0.3 
and 0.15, respectively.  
To find the optimal sequence of capital account liberalization, I need 
liberalization intensity measures of different types of transactions. Obviously, the 
breakdown of the aggregate capital account transaction dummy into 13 subcategory 
dummy in Miniane (2004) is too specific and makes the sequencing test literally 
impossible as the permutation of 13 individual transactions is an astronomical 
number. So I cluster the 12 subcategories, excluding the multiple exchange rate 
arrangement since it is not a specific transaction, into three major types of capital 
transactions: banking transactions, portfolio investment transactions, and direct 
investment transactions. Thus, the total number of potential sequencing paths goes 
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down to 6 among three major transactions. Specifically, I label subcategory 
transaction 2, 5, 6, 7, and 11 mentioned earlier as banking transactions. Portfolio 
investment transactions cover subcategories 1, 3, 4, and 12. Transactions 8, 9 and 10 
are belonging to direct investment transactions.  
The three types of transactions encompass the 6 different categories created in 
Johnston (1998, p.21): “Capital and Money Market, Credit Operations, Direct 
Investment and Real Estate Transactions, Provisions Specific to Commercial Banks, 
Personal Capital Movement, and Provision Specific to Institution Investors.” The total 
permutation of potential liberalization sequences is still quite large, 720 out of 6 
transaction categories. Three major transactions only expect 6 different major 
sequences of liberalizations regardless of liberalization timing. So my three-way 
solution of grouping 12 subcategory transactions significantly lessens the amount of 
empirical work without losing much generalizability of the results.  
Next I average the restrictions by group. The level of capital controls for each 
type of transactions is between 0 and 1. The value of 1 represents full-scale capital 
controls and zero means no controls at all. Figure 2 illustrates that the restriction level 
of the three types of capital transactions also declined over the period at different 
paces. For instance, from Figure 2, we can see that Japan had two major rounds of 
liberalizations across the three types of transactions. The first round began in 1984, 
when they lifted restrictions on banking transactions and direct investment 
transactions, followed by the liberalization of security investment transactions in 
1987. In the second round between 1995 and 1999, however, the liberalization 
sequence went from banking transactions to portfolio investment transactions, and 
then direct investment transactions.  
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It could be argued that my indicator measures just the extent of capital account 
liberalization as the IMF only tracks the existence of different types of capital 
controls. Given that different capital account transactions are rarely good substitutes 
for each another, however, countries can tighten up capital controls by imposing 
multiple layers of restrictions on different capital transactions to prevent the private 
sector circumventing the policy. Thus, the extensity index of capital controls is a 
reasonable proxy to the intensity of capital controls (Chinn and Ito 2006).  
The annual change of the restriction level for each type of transaction captures 
liberalization intensity. A negative change of the level means lifted control, while a 
positive change implies more restrictions. To have an ascending indicator for the 
liberalization intensity, I continue to subtract from zero the original value of level 
change. For example, an initial annual change of -0.5 for the restriction level, 
meaning a halfway liberalization, becomes 0.5 after the transformation. Thus, a higher 
value of the indicator implies more liberalization in each type of transactions.  
Table 2 presents all the nonzero values of the converted liberalization 
indicator for each area for 27 out of 33 countries. Some countries followed clear-cut 
paths. For instance, Italy had a comprehensive liberalization across all three groups in 
both 1988 and 1990. Argentina, however, liberalized some banking and portfolio 
investment transactions in 1987 and then two years later, relaxed restrictions on direct 
investment transactions. In 1996, Argentina initiated another dramatic shift towards 
more openness in banking transactions, but tightened up restrictions in portfolio and 
direct investment transactions. France started its sequence by liberalizing banking 
transactions at the same magnitude in two consecutive years from 1988 to 1989, 
continued the momentum to direct investment transactions in 1994, and concluded 
with fewer restrictions in security investment transactions in 1998. 
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A brief look at the graphical pattern of liberalization intensity indicators shows 
that most countries pursued the sequencing reform strategy among three types of 
capital account transactions, banking, portfolio investment, and direct investment, in 
the sample period. The next section provides the result of the empirical test for 
identifying the optimal liberalization sequence based on the growth effects of 
different sequences.  
 
IV. A Simple Test on the Optimal Liberalization Sequence 
I first check my liberalization indicators in cross-sectional growth regressions 
to see how effective they are able to capture the growth effect of the liberalization 
policy across countries. The capital account liberalization should have a theoretically 
temporary growth effect according to the Solow model. In a closed economy at the 
steady state where the capital stock and the labor force are growing at the same rate, 
capital account liberalization decreases the real interest rate if there are capital 
inflows. As a result, some negative net present value (NPV) projects would turn into 
positive NPV projects. The physical investment will go up until the marginal return of 
capital equals the lowering cost of capital. The growth rate of capital stock then will 
go down to the previous steady state level (Henry 2000). From the perspective of 
institutional economics, capital account liberalization would bring into developing 
countries more transparent financial markets and more efficient domestic financial 
institutions, which also directly increase economic growth besides the investment 
effect. So I augment a standard growth regression with my liberalization indicators, 
which is as follows:  
εββββ γ iiiiii XBHLQuinnKY +++++= ∆∆
'
32,10
 (1) 
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where Yi is the average growth rate of the logarithm of real GDP per capita from 1983 
to 2000. The overall capital account liberalization indicator I use is the change of the 
average of 13 dummies between 1983 and 2000 in Miniane (2004), “∆K”, for all 33 
countries. In addition, I include two more liberalization indicators used in the 
literature: (1) “∆Quinn”, the change of Quinn’s 0-4 intensity indicator of capital 
account openness between 1973 and 1988 (Quinn, 1997), and (2) “BHL,” the 
proportion of years in the period from 1983 to 2000 since the formal stock market 
liberalization is officially enforced according to the date in Bekaert, Harvey, and 
Lundblad (2004), which measures the length of the horizon during which foreign 
investors had a reliable access to domestic stock markets. “∆Quinn”, though 
overlapping part of my sample span, is still an acceptable benchmark to see whether 
my indicators can reveal new developments of the reform in the 1990s, since this is 
the most widely used liberalization indicator in the literature. Same logic applies to 
“BHL” since it would reveal to some extent the timing effect of stock market 
liberalization that is different from my indicators. The low correlation coefficients 
among the three indicators, 0.16 for “∆K” and “∆Quinn” and 0.25 for “∆K” and 
“BHL”, confirm that each indicator captures a separate dynamic of capital account 
liberalization in my sample.  
The control variable matrix, Xi includes: the logarithm of the level of real per 
capita income in 1983, both the average investment rate of GDP and the average 
population growth rate from 1983 to 2000, and the logarithm of the secondary school 
attainment rate in 1980. The standard growth model, as stated in Mankiw, Romer, and 
Weil (1992), only has the initial GDP per capita, the average investment rate, and the 
initial education attainment rate. I augment the regression even more with the 
population growth rate and the institution quality measure introduced below. The 
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economic growth rate and investment rate are from the Penn World Table 6.1 
(Heston, Summers, & Aten, 2002). The education attainment data are from Barro and 
Lee’s Cross-Country Education Attainment Database 2000 (Center for International 
Development Center, 2002).   
We can see from the first column in Table 3 that the overall liberalization 
indicator is negatively associated with economic growth and its coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The statistical relationship remains the same 
in column 2, in addition two widely utilized liberalization indicators in the literature: 
“∆Quinn” and “BHL”, whose estimated coefficients are insignificant. Surprisingly, 
my overall liberalization suppressing other liberalization indicators is negatively 
correlated with economic growth in the sample. The reason could be that most 
countries are OECD countries and already have a mature and highly developed 
financial system. So the financial liberalization is not necessarily an economic policy 
of significant economic consequences to developed countries as it’s been claimed to 
developing countries.   
In the columns 3 and 4 of table 3, I test my indicator against the argument in 
Rodrik (1998) that capital account liberalization is a signal of the domestic 
institutional quality to the world market. I add to the regression two institutional 
quality indexes from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 1996. The first index 
is government repudiation of contract index on the assessment of the risk of a 
modification in a contract (“GovRep”). The second index is the rule of law index on 
the degree of the law and order tradition (“Law”). In the model, both variables are the 
average of the months of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 
1995, available from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002). They were also 
used in Knack and Keefer (1995) but for different years. The coefficient on “∆Ki” 
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maintains its statistical significance at the 0.05 level along with “Law” in column 4 
but not with “GovRep” in column 3. Thus, the results of no significant growth effect 
of the liberalization in Rodrik (1998) may be due to the different choice of institution 
quality measures.  
Among control variables, the negative coefficient of initial level of income 
shows conditional convergence among the countries in my sample. The positive 
coefficient of the average investment rate confirms the growth enhancing effect of 
physical capital in the sample period. This is consistent with the findings in Fagerberg 
(1994) and Levine and Renelt (1992) that only those two variables have robust, 
statistically significant coefficients in the current economic growth literature. The 
coefficient of the average secondary education attainment rate is highly insignificant..  
Though the overall liberalization indicator has a negative growth effect, I 
continue to test whether the three group liberalization indicators for banking 
transactions (“Bk”), portfolio investment transactions (“Eq”), and direct investment 
transactions (“Di”) might be positively correlated with the growth rate in separate 
cases. As we can see in columns 1, 2, and 3 of table 4, the coefficients of “Bk” and 
“Di” are negative and statistically significant and the coefficient of “Eq” is just 
insignificant. The liberalization of each group of transactions actually either causes a 
slowdown of economic growth or has no effect at all. The remaining three columns in 
table 4 show that the negative growth effects of Bi and Di remain unchanged after the 
inclusion of “∆Quinn” and “BHL”.  
Neither the overall liberalization indicator nor the group indicator is positively 
correlated with economic growth. But the conditional growth effects from the 
liberalization sequence tested are positive, which might shed some lights on how to 
operate capital account liberalization program. 
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I use multiplicative interaction models to capture the optimal liberalization 
sequence among three types of capital transactions. The specifications of the basic 
models are as follows:  
εββββββ γ titiktijtititiktitijtiit XDiEqBkBkDiBkEqY ,
'
,,5,4,3,,2,,10
+++++++=
−−−−
 (2) 
εββββββ γ titiktitihtitiktitihtiit XDiEqBkEqDiEqBkY ,
'
,,5,4,3,,2,,10
+++++++=
−−−−
 (3) 
εββββββ γ tititijtihtitijtitihtiit XDiEqBkDiEqDiBkY ,
'
,,5,4,3,,2,,10
+++++++=
−−−−
 (4) 
The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of real income per capita. 
Bkit stands for the liberalization indicator of banking transactions, Eqit for portfolio 
investment transactions, and Diit for direct investment transactions. The country index 
is i and the time index is t. The subscripts – h, j, and k – are the number of time lags 
of each indicator.  
The explanation of how interaction terms capture the liberalization sequence 
with the best growth effect is as follows. Among three types of capital account 
transactions – 1 standing for banking transactions (“Bk”), 2 for portfolio transactions 
(“Eq”), and 3 for direct investment transactions (“Di”) – there are six permutations of 
the general liberalization sequence: 321, 231, 312, 132, 123, and 213, regardless of 
specific liberalization timings. For instance, “321” is the sequence of “Di”, “Eq”, and 
“Bk”, and “231” is for “Eq”, “Di”, and “Bk”. In both cases, banking transactions are 
the last group to liberalize.  
Thus, Equation 2 interacts “Bkit” with both the lagged indicator of portfolio 
transactions, “Eqi,t-j,” and the lagged direct investment indicator, “Dii,t-k,” to test the 
effect of the sequences of liberalizing both portfolio investment and direct investment 
transactions before banking transactions. The subscripts “j” for “Eqi,t-j” and “k” for 
“Dii,t-k” are changed to count for the liberalization timing of the transactions of 
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portfolio investment and of direct investment relative to when banking transactions 
are opened. When there is no early change of the liberalization indicators of portfolio 
investment and direct investment transactions, then the effect of the banking 
liberalization indicator (Bkit) on economic growth is simply the coefficient β3. That 
Eqi,t-j and Dii,t-k are equal to zero makes the two interaction terms on the right hand 
side of the equation disappear.   
Alternatively, when there are earlier liberalizations in the areas of portfolio 
investment and direct investment than in banking transactions, Eqi,t-j and Dii,t-k are 
non-zero. The conditional effect of Bkit on economic growth becomes β 3 + β1 * Eqi,t-j 
+ β2 * Dii,t-k since three terms on the right hand side of Equation 2, including two 
interaction terms, contain Bkit. For instance, that “k” equals 5 and “j” is 1 represents 
liberalizing portfolio investment five years early and direct investment one year early 
before opening banking transactions, and the lag between “Eqi,t-j” and “Dii,t-k” is four 
years. Similarly, Equation 3 estimates the growth effect of all possible sequences that 
open direct investment and banking transaction years before lifting restrictions on 
portfolio investment transactions, i.e. the permutations “132” and “312.” The 
specifications of the Equation 4 tests the growth effect of the last two general 
liberalization sequences, the permutations “123” and “213,” of which the 
liberalization of banking and portfolio investment transactions are years before that of 
direct investment transactions. 
I investigate up to 6 lags for lagged indicators in each of the three equations, 
which means the three subscripts – k, h, and j – range from one to six. Each equation 
is estimated 42 times due to the combinations of two lagged indicators in the 
interaction terms. To compare the growth effects across different sequences, the 
number of observations for all estimations must be the same. I have to truncate the 
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first six years of the sample, as the group liberalization indicators are available from 
1984, in order to test up to 6 lags in each equation. Thus, the final sample for the 
optimal liberalization sequence test has 363 observations of 33 countries over a span 
of 11 years from 1990 to 2000. Brambor, Clark and Golder (2005) suggest that all 
constitutive terms, the linear elements consisting of interaction terms, should be in the 
estimation to prevent biased estimates of β1 and β2, which are the coefficients of two 
interaction terms that intend to capture the conditional growth effect of the specific 
liberalization sequences among three groups. 
The matrix of control variables, Xit, includes: the natural logarithm of real 
GDP per capita of 1983, initial investment rate of 1983, and the logarithm of 
secondary education attainment level among population over age 25 of 1980, which 
are all fixed in the sample. Because country fixed effects generate a near singular 
matrix, I instead use continent dummies: Africa, Europe, North America, and South 
America with Asia dummy omitted. The period fixed effects are included in the 
model to control for the effects of the major global financial crises covered in the 
sample period.  
In Table 5, I report the results of five different sequences, which have both 
interaction terms statistically significant at the 0.05 level, out of 126 specifications for 
the three equations. Only the first two sequences in coloumn1 and 2, where banking 
transactions are the last liberalized group, have a positive coefficient for the two 
interaction terms. The other three sequences in columns 3, 4, and 5, where either 
portfolio investment or direct investment were the latest group to be liberalized, have 
a positive coefficient on one interaction term and a negative coefficient on the other. 
So the overall growth effects of the last three sequences are either negative or close to 
zero. Among control variables, the coefficient of the initial income is negative and 
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that of physical investment rate is positive as expected. Both are statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level. The Africa dummy is the only statistically significant 
continent dummy.  
The sum of the coefficients for the two interaction terms is higher in column 1 
than in column 2. I also compare the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values of 
the two specifications. The basic idea for using AIC is to examine the complexity as 
well as goodness of fit of the model to the sample data. A model with many 
parameters will provide a good fit to the data, but will have few degrees of freedom, 
which dampens the power of the model’s references. So the AIC approach constrains 
overfitting. The lower the AIC value, the better fit to the data is the specification 
given the same number of parameters. The first sequence where j=5 and k=1 has an 
AIC value of -4.131, less than -4.113 of the second sequence where j=5 and k=3. 
Consistent with the sequenced selected based on the sign and the size of coefficients 
of interaction terms, the AIC value also identify that the same sequence, in which the 
5-year lagged Eqit and the one-year lagged Diit are included in the interaction terms, 
fits the sample the best. The optimal capital account liberalization is to liberalize 
portfolio investment transactions 5 years ahead and direct investment transactions 1 
year ahead of banking transactions.  
The conditional effect of Bkit on annual economic growth would be as large as 
0.549 percent (0.269*1+0.304*1-0.024), when portfolio investment transactions and 
direct investment transactions were completely liberalized precisely at 5 years and at 
1 year before banking transactions was opened, i.e. both Eqt-5 and Dit-1 being equal to 
1. The lower bound of Bkit’s marginal effect is as small as 0.144 percent 
(0.269*0.25+0.304*0.33-0.024), where the restriction is lifted for only one of the four 
portfolio investment transactions, Eqt-5 being 0.25, and one of the three direct 
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investment transactions, Dit-1 being 0.33. liberalizing banking transactions alone is 
negatively correlated with economic growth. The conditional marginal effect of Bkit 
on economic growth, when Eqi,t-k and Dii,t-j are zero, is negative 0.023 percent, which 
is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
Though β1, β2, and β3 are all statistically significant, it is still possible for the 
conditional marginal effect of Bki,t to be insignificant for substantively relevant values 
of Eqt-5 and Dit-1 if all three covariance terms between β1, β2 and β3 are positive. 
According to Brambor et al. (2005), as )cov( 31
∧∧
ββ , )cov( 21
∧∧
ββ , and )cov( 32
∧∧
ββ are 
not usually reported from the standard statistics packages, a graphical illustration of 
how the marginal effect of Bkt changes across all the relevant values of Equityt-5 and 
Directt-1 would help address the concern. Each point on the solid line is 
53121 −− ++=
∂
∂
itit
it
it EqDi
Bank
Y
βββ . The 95% confidence interval around each point 
tells that the positive marginal effect is statistically significant from 0 for 10 out of 12 
combinations between four different values of Eqt-5 (0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 1) and three 
different values of Dit-1 (0.33, 0.67, and 1) when both the upper and lower bounds of 
the interval are above the zero line. The exceptions are when Dit-1 is 0.33 or Eqt-5 is 
either 0.25 or 0.5. Thus, at least 3 portfolio investment transactions and/or at least 2 
direct investment transactions need to be liberalized to guarantee that the sequencing 
strategy has a statistically positive correlation with economic growth.  
In Table 2, we can find that several countries at least partially did the optimal 
sequence. The US liberalized 2 portfolio investment transactions in 1984, where Eqi,t 
is 0.5, and one banking transaction five years later in 1989, Bki,t being 0.2. Turkey 
and Finland, by coincidence, opened one direct investment transaction, Dii,t being 
0.33,  at the same time in 1989 and two banking transactions the year after 1990, 
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where Bki,t is 0.4. And Eqi,t of 1986 is 0.25 and 0.5 for Spain and Portugal 
respectively, and Bki,t is 0.2 in both countries in 1991. 
The only other paper in the literature discussing the liberalization sequence 
between the banking market and equity market is Chinn and Ito (2006). However, 
their paper did not directly test sequencing capital account liberalization. In a sample 
of 108 countries over the period from 1980 to 2000, Chinn and Ito (2002) control the 
overall quality of various institutions and legal systems and the intensity index of 
capital account liberalization. Their evidence shows that the development of the 
banking market, in terms of private credit from deposit money banks as a ratio of 
GDP, is a precondition for the development of the equity market in three measures of 
either stock market capitalization and total value of stock traded as a ratio of GDP, as 
well as stock market turnover ratio. However, in the earlier sections of the paper, they 
only establish the connection between equity market development and financial 
openness, but no connection between banking market development and financial 
liberalization, when the institutional and legal system quality are above a certain 
threshold level. Their sequence of financial development only suggests a 
hypothetically optimal liberalization sequence of the same order that opens the 
banking market before the equity market.  
Differing from Chinn and Ito (2006), my paper attempts to test more directly 
the capital account liberalization sequence leading to higher growth rate of real per 
capita GDP by using the liberalization intensity indicators in three areas of capital 
account transactions. In addition, my empirical model specification does not restrict 
the sequencing timing to exactly 5 years apart between different areas, but from one 
to up to six years. Chinn and Ito (2006), however, conduct their analysis in a 5-year 
non-overlapping panel so that the precondition sequence between the equity market 
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and banking market has to be five years with no other possibilities. Basically, their 
paper has no intent of capturing the timing issue between different steps of the 
liberalization process.  
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
The debate on the role of capital account liberalization in promoting economic 
growth has been an active research area over the last two decades. But little direct 
evidence is available for an optimal sequence of capital account liberalization. This 
paper is a step toward conducting an explicit test on growth effects of liberalization 
sequences among different types of capital account transactions. I create three 
separate liberalization intensity indicators for banking transactions, equity investment 
transactions, and direct investment transactions. The sequence of the liberalization 
that enhances economic growth of per capita income, in the sample of 21 developed 
countries and 11 emerging market countries, is in the order of lifting restrictions of 
equity investment transactions five years earlier and those of the direct investment 
transactions one year earlier than opening banking transactions.  
Furthermore, I want to give some ideas for future research. First of all, the 
disaggregated restriction binary variables for capital account transactions, as 
constructed in Miniane (2004), need to be expanded for more developing countries 
since the policy discussed here is more crucial for economic development in those 
countries than in developed countries. Secondly, researchers could use the first 
principal component of binary variables in each of the three groups as the 
liberalization intensity indicator like the capital account opening indicator in Chinn 
and Ito (2006).  Thirdly, researchers can study from the political economy perspective 
to explain why some countries opened banking transactions early while others 
liberalized equity market transactions as the first step of domestic financial reform. It 
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could be that entrenched interests are unevenly distributed across different financial 
markets, so that the competition for the rights to make certain cross-border financial 
transactions would help break legal restrictions in the areas with least resistance from 
incumbent interests. 
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Figure 1: The Average of Dummies on the 13 subcategory Capital Account 
Restrictions  
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Figure 2: The Liberalization Indicators for Three Types of Capital Transactions 
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Figure 3: The marginal effect of the liberalization indicator of banking transactions on 
economic growth 
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Table 1  Summary Statistics of Capital Account Restrictions Measure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Mean STD Max. Min. 
%Change of 
Max. vs. Min.  
      
Argentina   0.5922 0.2128 0.9167 0.3077 66.43% 
Australia   0.4936 0.0147 0.5000 0.4615 7.69% 
Austria   0.4615 0.1828 0.6923 0.3077 55.56% 
Belgium   0.5128 0.1421 0.6154 0.1538 75.00% 
Brazil   0.9701 0.0598 1.0000 0.8462 15.38% 
Canada   0.1880 0.0658 0.2308 0.0769 66.67% 
Switzerland  0.2179 0.0544 0.3077 0.1538 50.00% 
Chile   0.9915 0.0249 1.0000 0.9231 7.69% 
Colombia   0.9558 0.0733 1.0000 0.8333 16.67% 
Denmark   0.2650 0.2407 0.6923 0.0769 88.89% 
Ecuador   0.5812 0.1402 0.8462 0.3846 54.55% 
Spain  0.5616 0.3086 0.9231 0.2308 75.00% 
Finland   0.5171 0.3377 0.9231 0.1538 83.33% 
France   0.4402 0.1746 0.6923 0.2308 66.67% 
UK  0.0769 0.0000 0.0769 0.0769 0.00% 
Germany   0.2222 0.0583 0.3077 0.0769 75.00% 
Greece  0.5000 0.3630 0.9231 0.0769 91.67% 
Hong Kong  0.1026 0.0590 0.2308 0.0769 66.67% 
India   0.9181 0.0027 0.9231 0.9167 0.69% 
Italy   0.4060 0.2430 0.7692 0.2308 70.00% 
Japan   0.4359 0.1371 0.6923 0.1538 77.78% 
Korea   0.8333 0.0295 0.8462 0.7692 9.09% 
Mexico  0.8775 0.0422 0.9231 0.8333 9.72% 
Malaysia   0.8462 0.0000 0.8462 0.8462 0.00% 
Netherlands   0.1410 0.1475 0.4615 0.0769 83.33% 
Norway   0.3889 0.2307 0.7692 0.2308 70.00% 
Philippines   0.8846 0.0396 0.9231 0.8462 8.33% 
Portugal   0.4615 0.2531 0.9231 0.1538 83.33% 
Singapore   0.2650 0.0709 0.4615 0.2308 50.00% 
Sweden   0.4957 0.2258 0.8462 0.3077 63.64% 
Turkey   0.7682 0.1310 0.9231 0.6154 33.33% 
US 0.2650 0.0603 0.4615 0.2308 50.00% 
South Africa  0.8590 0.0476 0.9231 0.7692 16.67% 
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Table 2 Summary of Liberalization Indicators for Three Groups  
 
COUNTRY YEAR BANK PORTFOLIO DIRECT 
Argentina 1987 0.2000 0.3333 - 
 1989 - - 0.3333 
 1990 - 0.3333 - 
 1993 - - 0.3333 
 1996 0.6000 -0.1667 -0.3333 
 1997 - -0.2500 - 
 1998 -0.2000 - - 
 1998 - 0.1667 - 
     
Austria 1989 0.2000 0.2500 - 
  1991 0.6000 - - 
     
Belgium 1996 0.2000 - - 
  1999 0.2000 0.5000 0.3333 
     
Brazil 1997 - - 0.3333 
     
Canada 1995 0.2000 0.2500 - 
  1999 -0.2000 - - 
     
Colombia 1996 - - 0.3333 
     
Denmark 1984 - 0.2500 - 
 1988 0.6000 0.5000 0.3333 
 1990 0.2000 - - 
 1998 -0.2000 -0.2500 - 
     
Ecuador 1986 - 0.5000 - 
 1988 - - 0.3333 
 1991 - - 0.3333 
 1994 - - 0.3333 
 1998 -0.2000 - - 
 2000 0.2000 - - 
     
Finland 1989 - - 0.3333 
 1990 0.4000 0.2500 - 
 1991 0.4000 0.2500 0.3333 
 1992 - 0.2500 - 
 2000 - - 0.3333 
     
France 1988 0.4000 - - 
 1989 0.4000 - - 
 1994 - - 0.3333 
 1998 - 0.2500 - 
 2000 - -0.2500 - 
     
Germany 1984 -0.2000 - - 
 1985 0.2000 - - 
 1997 - -0.2500 - 
 1998 0.2000 - - 
 1999 0.2000 0.2500 - 
     
Greece 1986 0.2000 - - 
 1990 0.2000 0.2500 0.3333 
 1992 - - 0.3333 
 1993 - 0.2500 - 
 1994 0.6000 0.5000 - 
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 2000 - -0.2500 - 
          
COUNTRY YEAR BANK PORTFOLIO DIRECT 
Hong Kong 1998 - -0.5000 - 
     
Italy 1988 0.4000 0.2500 0.3333 
  1990 0.2000 0.2500 0.3333 
     
Japan 1984 0.2000 - 0.3333 
 1988 - 0.2500 - 
 1996 0.2000 - - 
 1998 0.2000 0.2500 - 
 1999 - - 0.3333 
     
Korea 1998 - 0.2500 - 
     
Netherlands 1986 0.6000 0.5000 - 
     
Norway 1984 - - 0.3333 
  1989 0.8000 0.5000 - 
     
Philippines 1992 - - 0.3333 
     
Portugal 1986 0.4000 0.5000 0.3333 
 1989 -0.2000 - - 
 1990 0.2000 - - 
 1991 0.2000 -0.2500 0.3333 
 1992 0.2000 0.2500 - 
 1996 - - 0.3333 
 1999 0.2000 - - 
 2000 -0.2000 - - 
     
Singapore 1997 - -0.2500 - 
  1998 - -0.2500 - 
  2000 -0.2000 - - 
     
South Africa 1989 - - -0.3333 
     
Spain 1986 - 0.2500 - 
 1989 - 0.0833 - 
 1991 0.2000 - - 
 1992 0.6000 0.6667 0.3333 
 1996 - -0.2500 - 
 1999 - - 0.3333 
     
Sweden 1984 0.2000 - - 
 1986 -0.2000 - - 
 1987 0.2000 - - 
 1989 0.6000 0.2500 - 
 1992 - 0.5000 - 
     
Switzerland 1986 0.2000 - - 
  1995 - 0.2500 - 
     
Turkey 1989 - - 0.3333 
  1990 0.4000 0.2500 - 
  1996 -0.4000 - - 
     
United States 1984 - 0.5000 - 
  1989 0.2000 - - 
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Table 3 Cross-country Growth Regressions, Average Growth Rate of Real Per Capita 
GDP as Dependent Variable, 1983-2000 
 
  1 2 3 4 
     
Intercept 0.144 0.172 0.167 0.182 
(t-stat) 4.71 4.95 4.41 5.98 
     
ln (initial inc.) -0.015 -0.02 -0.02 -0.021 
(t-stat) -4.71 -4.62 -5.02 -5.71 
     
Average Inv.83-00 0.0017 0.0016 0.0015 0.0015 
(t-stat) 10.9 7.35 7.05 7.002 
     
ln (initial Educ.) 0.0009 0.001 0.0007 0.0007 
(t-stat) 0.35 0.395 0.23 0.25 
     
∆pop83-00 -0.07 -0.057 -0.045 -0.055 
(t-stat) -2.98 -2.2 -1.41 -2.01 
     
∆K83-00 -0.025 -0.022 -0.018 -0.022 
(t-stat) -2.72 -2.4 -1.59 -2.3 
     
∆Quinn73-88  0.0023 0.0023 0.0025 
(t-stat)  1.25 1.26 1.52 
     
BHL83-00  0.015 0.013 0.001 
(t-stat)  1.3 1.06 0.58 
     
GovRep   0.0017   
(t-stat)   0.56   
     
Law    0.002 
(t-stat)    0.57 
     
R-square 0.672 0.703 0.708 0.71 
No. of observations 33 33 33 33 
Notes: all estimates using OLS with White robust standard errors; ln(initial inc.) = ln real per capita 
income in the first year of sample, 1983; ln(initial Educ.) = ln (secondary-school attainment rate in 
the pop over age 25) in 1980; Average Inv.83-00= investment to GDP ratio averaged between 1983 
and 2000. ∆pop83-00 = average population growth over sample period; Africa dummy = dummy 
variable for African countries; ∆K83-00 = the change in the average of 13 subcategory transaction 
dummies between 1983 and 2000 from Miniane (2004); ∆Quinn73-88 = change of capital account 
openness between 1973 and 1988 from Quinn (1997); BHL83-00 = Proportion of years between 1983 
and 2000 with liberalized stock market, using dates of stock market liberalization from Bekaert, 
Harvey, and Lundblad (2001). Govrep = An index of International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) 
assessment on the degree to which governments do not repudiate contracts; range is 1-10; and larger 
values indicate government less likely to repudiate contract; Law = An ICRG index of the law and 
order tradition of a country; it ranges from 10, strong law and order tradition, to 1, weal law and 
order tradition; Govrep and Law are available from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) 
bold denotes coefficients are significant at the 0.05 level or less; italic denotes coefficients are 
significant between the 0.05 level and the 0.1 level.  
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Table 4. Cross-Sectional Results for Three Sub-group Liberalization Indicators, 
Growth Rate of Real GDP Per Capita as Dependent Variables, 1983-2000 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
Intercept 0.122 0.127 0.15 0.165 0.16 0.184 
(t-stat) 3.22 3.18 5.03 4.24 3.84 6.14 
       
ln (initial inc.) -0.014 -0.015 -0.016 -0.02 -0.02 -0.022 
(t-stat) -3.3 -3.35 -5.27 -4.04 -3.94 -5.85 
       
Average Inv.83-00  0.0018 0.0017 0.0019 0.0016 0.0016 0.0017 
(t-stat) 10.27 8.68 12.03 6.69 5.47 8.23 
       
ln (initial Educ.) 0.0018 0.0024 -0.0011 0.0018 0.0023 -0.0009 
(t-stat) 0.68 0.84 -0.38 0.7 0.77 -0.31 
       
∆pop83-00 -0.056 -0.05 -0.056 -0.043 -0.037 -0.044 
(t-stat) -2.72 -2.06 -3.16 -1.83 -1.45 -2.36 
       
Bk83-00 -0.013   -0.012   
(t-stat) -2.43   -2.05   
       
Eq83-00  -0.014   -0.011  
(t-stat)  -1.65   -1.45  
       
Di83-00   -0.018   -0.016 
(t-stat)   -2.85   -2.97 
       
∆Qinn73-88    0.0029 0.0027 0.0024 
(t-stat)    1.64 1.52 1.44 
       
BHL83-00    0.02 0.016 0.019 
(t-stat)    1.41 1.14 1.88 
       
R-square 0.602 0.613 0.691 0.659 0.654 0.734 
No. of observations 33 33 33 33 33 33 
 
Notes: See Table 3 for definition of variables. All estimates using OLS with White robust standard 
errors; bold denotes coefficients are significant at the 0.05 level or less; italic denotes coefficients 
are significant between the 0.05 level and the 0.1 level. Bk83-00 = change in the average of banking 
transaction dummies between 1983 and 2000; Eq83-00 = change in the average of portfolio 
investment transaction dummies between 1983 and 2000; Di83-00 = change in the average of direct 
investment dummies between 1983 and 2000.  
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Table 5. Liberalization Sequence Test, Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP per Capita as 
Dependent Variable 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
Interaction Term 1 Bkt-h* Eqt-j Bkt-h * Eqt-j Eqt-j * Bkt-h Eqt-j * Bkt-h FDIt-k * Bkt-h 
Interaction Term 2 Bkt-h * Dit-k Bkt-h * Dit-k Eqt-j * Dit-k Eqt-j * Dit-k FDIt-k * Eqt-j 
 h=0 h=0 h=4 h=4 h=3 
 j=5 j=5 j=0 j=0 j=1 
 k=1 k=3 k=5 k=3 k=0 
      
Intercept 0.089 0.084 0.097 0.093 0.098 
(s.e.) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) (0.027) 
      
ln (initial inc.)83 -0.0083 -0.008 -0.009 -0.0088 -0.011 
(s.e.) (0.0034) (0.0037) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0037) 
      
Initial Inv. 83 0.0012 0.0011 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 
(s.e.) (0.0002) (0.00024) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
      
ln (initial Educ.) -0.0023 -0.0015 -0.0023 -0.002 0.0028 
(s.e.) (0.0024) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0021) (0.0035) 
      
∆popt -0.372 -0.307 -0.515 -0.463 -0.391 
(s.e.) (0.198) (0.193) (0.178) (0.193) (0.239) 
      
Interaction Term 1 0.269 0.31 0.401 0.372 0.509 
(s.e.) (0.083) (0.076) (0.153) (0.151) (0.204) 
       
Interaction Term 2 0.304 0.215 -0.378 -0.462 -0.913 
(s.e.) (0.05) (0.096) (0.103) (0.189) (0.256) 
      
Bkt-h -0.023 -0.027 -0.015 -0.017 -0.0037 
(s.e.) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) 
      
Eqt-j 0.0138 0.015 -0.05 -0.044 -0.022 
(s.e.) (0.0158) (0.0148) (0.015) (0.176) (0.019) 
      
Dit-k -0.0595 0.009 -0.037 0.024 0.012 
(s.e.) (0.0196) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.034) 
      
Africa Dummy -0.019 -0.018 -0.018 -0.016 -0.017 
(s.e.) (0.0068) (0.0062) (0.0064) (0.0054) (0.0062) 
      
R-square 0.187 0.172 0.195 0.198 0.187 
AIC -4.131 -4.113 -4.141 -4.145 -4.132 
No. of observations 363 363 363 363 363 
 
Notes: all estimates using OLS with White robust standard errors; ln(initial inc.) = ln real per capita 
income in the first year of sample, 1983; ln(initial Educ.) = ln (secondary-school attainment rate in the 
pop over age 25) in 1980; Initial Inv.= investment to GDP ratio in 1983. ∆popt = annual population 
growth over sample period; Bkt, Eqt and Dit are the annual difference in the average of dummies for 
three types of capital account transactions from 1984 to 2000. Europe dummy = dummy variable for 
European countries; North America dummy = dummy variable for North American countries; South 
America dummy = dummy variable for South American countries; All estimates using the period fixed 
effect panel data analysis with White robust standard errors; bold denotes coefficients are significant at 
the 0.05 level or less; italic denotes coefficients are significant between the 0.05 level and the 0.1 level. 
75 
 
  
References  
 
Alesina, A., V. Grilli, and G.-M. Milesi-Ferretti (1994), “The Political Economy of 
Capital Controls,” in L. Leiderman and A. Razin, eds., Capital Mobility: The Impact on 
Consumption, Investment, and Growth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Arteta, Carlos, Barry Eichengreen, and Charles Wyplosz, 2001, “On the Growth Effect of 
Capital Account Liberalization,” (unpublished, Berkeley, California: University of 
California).  
 
Bekaert, G., C. Harvey and C. Lundblad (2004), “Does Financial Liberalization Spur 
Growth,” Journal of Financial Economics 77, 3-56.   
 
Bertolini, L. and A. Drazen (1997a), “Capital Account Liberalization as a Signal,” 
American Economic Review 87, 138-154.  
 
_____ (1997b), “When Liberal Policies Reflect External Shocks, What Do We Learn?,” 
Journal of International Economics 42, 249-73.  
 
Brambor, T., W. Clark and M. Golder (2005), “Understanding Interaction Models: 
Improving Empirical Analyses,” Political Analysis, forthcoming.  
 
Barro, R. J. and J. W. Lee (2000), International data on educational attainment: updates 
and implications. Center for International Development at Harvard University 
Working Paper no. 42.  
 
Chanda, A. (2005), “The Influence of Capital Controls on Long-Run Growth: Where and 
How Much?” Journal of Development Economics 77, 441-466.   
 
Chinn, M. and H. Ito (2006), “What Matters for Financial Development? Capital 
Controls, Institutions, and Interaction.” Journal of Development Economics, 
forthcoming.  
 
_____ and _____ (2002), “Capital Account Liberalizations, Institutions, and Financial 
Development: Cross Country Evidence” NBER Working Paper 8967.  
 
Edison, H., M. Klein, L. Ricci, and T. SlØk (2004), “Capital Account Liberalization and 
Economic Performance: Survey and Synthesis,” IMF Staff Papers 51, 220-256.  
 
Edwards, S., (2001), “Capital Mobility and Economic Performance: Are Emerging 
Economies Different?” NBER Working Paper No. 8076 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
National Bureau of Economic Research).  
 
_____ and G. Tabellini (1991), “Explaining Fiscal Policies and Inflation in Developing 
Countries,” Journal of International Money and Finance 10, S16-S48.  
 
76 
 
  
Eichengreen, B., (1996), Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary 
System, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
 
_____ (2001), “Capital Account Liberalization: What Do the Cross-Country Studies Tell 
US?,” The World Bank Economic Review15, 341-65.   
Fagerberg, J. (1994), “Technology and International Differences in Growth Rates,” 
Journal of Economic Literature 32, 1147-75.  
 
Frenkel, J. (1982), “The Order of Economic Liberalization: A Comment,” in K. Brunner 
and A. Meltzer, eds., Economic Policy in a World of Change, Amsterdam: North-
Holland.  
 
Grilli, V. and G.- M. Milesi-Ferretti (1995), “Economic Effects and Structural 
Determinants of Capital Controls,” IMF Staff Papers 42, 517-51.  
 
Husian, A, A. Mody and K. Rogoff (2005), “Exchange Rates Durability and Performance 
in Developing versus Advanced Economies,” Journal of Monetary Economics 52, 35-
64. 
 
Henry, P., (2000), “Do Stock Market Liberalizations Cause Investment Booms?” Journal 
of Financial Economics 58, 301-334.  
 
Heston, A., R. Summers and B. Aten, (2002), Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for 
International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP).  
 
Johnston, B. (1998), “Sequencing Capital Account Liberalizations,” Finance and 
Development 35, 20-23.  
 
_____, S. Darbar and C. Echeverria (1997), “Sequencing Capital Account Liberalization: 
Lessons from the Experiences in Chile, Indonesia, Korea and Thailand,” IMF Staff 
Working Papers.  
 
Klein, Michael W., (2003), “Capital Account Openness and the Varieties of Growth 
Experience,” NBER Working Paper No. 9500 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of 
Economic Research). 
 
______ and G. Olivei (2006), “Capital Account Liberalization, Financial Depth and 
Economic Growth,” NBER Working Paper No. 7384. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
National Bureau of Economic Research).  
 
Knack, S. and P. Keefer (1995), “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country 
Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures,” Economics and Politics 7, 207-27.  
 
Leblang, D. (1997), “Domestic and Systemic Determinants of Capital Controls in the 
Developed and Developing World,” International Studies Quarterly 41, 435-454.  
 
77 
 
  
Levine, R. and D. Renelt (1992), “A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth 
Regressions,” American Economic Reviews 83, 426-30.  
 
Mankiw, G., D. Romer, and D. Weil (1992), “A Contribution to the Empirics of 
Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, 407-437 
 
McKinnon, R. (1973), Money and Capital in Economic Development, Washington D.C.: 
Brookings Institution.  
 
_____ (1982), “The Order of Economic Liberalization: Lessons from Chile and 
Argentina,” in K. Brunner and A. Meltzer, eds., Economic Policy in a World of 
Change, Amsterdam: North-Holland.  
 
_____ and G. Schnabl (2004), “The East Asian Dollar Standard, Fear of Floating, and 
Original Sin,” Review of Development Economics 8, 331-360.  
 
Miniane, J. (2004), “A New Set of Measures on Capital Account Restrictions,”  
IMF Staff Papers 51, 276-308.  
 
Obstfeld, M. (1998), “The Global Capital Market: Benefactor or Menace,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 12, 9-30.  
 
Quinn, D. (1997), “The Correlates of Change in International Financial Regulation,” 
American Political Science Review 91, 531-51.  
 
Rajan, R. and L. Zingales, 2003, “The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial 
Development in the 20th Century,” Journal of Financial Economics 69, 5-50.  
 
Rodrik, D. (1998), “Who Needs Capital Account Convertibility?,” Princeton Essays in 
International Finance 207,55-65.  
 
Roubini, N. and X. Sali-I-Martin (1995), “A Growth Model of Inflation, Tax Evasion, 
and Financial Repression,” Journal of Monetary Economics 35, 275-301.  
 
Solow, R.M. (1956), “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 70, 65-94.  
 
Stiglitz, J. (1999), “Reforming the Global Economic Architecture: Lessons from Recent 
Crises,” Journal of Finance 54, 1508-1521. 
 
 
 
